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Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 which will be inserted 
into the Competition Act 89 of 1998, will hold directors/executives criminally liable 
for infringing s4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibits 
firms from engaging in price-fixing, collusive tendering, market allocation which are 
regarded as egregious forms of activity. The underlying justification for the cartel 
offence is the protection of consumer welfare and on the other hand to address the 
under-deterrent nature of monetary administrative penalties in the fight against 
cartels. In its current form, s73A has several weaknesses which will negatively 
impact competition enforcement; particularly the leniency policy which is the 
Commission’s most effective weapon against cartelisation.   
The emergence of follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy  and class actions 
as a procedural mechanism in the bread class action, have paved the way for private 
competition enforcement as a more effective deterrent. The lack of a statutory 
regulatory framework compelled the courts to develop the common law regarding 
follow-on damages litigation and class actions. Although the exercise has 
highlighted the challenges associated with the lack of judicial guidance in 
developing directives, it has indicated that private competition enforcement is a 


















It has been over a decade since the promulgation of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 
(“the Act”) and enormous strides have been made in the advancement of competition 
law and enforcement in South Africa. The current competition policy is indicative of 
a progressive move towards achieving what the Act so boldly proclaims in the 
preamble, as greater ownership of the economy by a greater number of South 
Africans.
1
 Therefore, the Act must strike a precarious balance; its reach must be felt 
by the poorest within the country, while taking cognisance of the overarching 
mandate to promote and protect the market economy. The essence of competition 
law has aptly been described as follows: 
The central purpose of competition law is the protection and promotion of a competitive 
market economy. In competitive markets, firms prosper (and indeed survive) by surpassing 
their rivals in identifying and serving consumer needs, with the result that resources are put 
to their best use leading to the provision of an appropriate amount of goods or services 




Competition law thus seeks to foster a perfect market by monitoring and 
controlling anti-competitive behaviour. In a monopoly situation, allocative 
inefficiency prevails because monopolists reduce production, increase product prices 
and distort the overall balance in a so-called perfect market.
3
 Consequentially, 
consumers are deprived of affordable, quality goods and services at competitive 
market prices.
4
 Therefore, competition law is rooted in ensuring that “social welfare 
is maximised in conditions of perfect competition”
5
 through a combination of 
allocative and productive efficiency. In order to maximise social welfare or 
consumer welfare (which is the concern of this discussion) the market must facilitate 
perfect competition. Competition law is thus predicated on the attainment of the 
perfect market which enables all business entities to compete equally.  
                                                          
1
 Preamble of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
2
 Luke Kelly ‘Introduction of a “Cartel Offence” into South African law’(2010) 21 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 321 at 322. 
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Whish & Bailey op cit (n3) 2. 
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South Africa’s market economy is characterised by concentrated markets, 
high entry level barriers and the production of mostly homogenous goods.
6
 The 
existence of concentrated markets contributes to anti-competitive behaviour due to 
firms maintaining too much market power. Concentrated markets are prone to 
undermining consumer welfare due to unjustified increases in product prices,  
production of poor quality products, thwarting innovation and most importantly, 
depriving consumers of choice.
7
  
A high prevalence of this behaviour is found in South Africa where cartels 





As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the growing number of 
cartels and the proclivity towards recidivist behaviour by firms such as South 
African Airways,
10
  which have previously been fined by the Competition Tribunal. 
It is my contention that the current public competition enforcement system is flawed 
and at times facilitates an environment that is prone to collusive conduct.  The 
administrative penalties imposed to anticompetitive firms are under deterrent and 
have become part and parcel of the cost of doing business.
11
  In response to the 
challenges associated with cartel enforcement, the criminalisation of cartel conduct 
was tabled as a suitable remedy.  
The Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 (“Amendment Act”) will 
introduce a cartel offence. Section 73A
12
 will specifically hold directors of 
companies who are found guilty of cartel conduct, criminally liable. A detailed 
consideration of the cartel offence will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The 
comparative analysis between the United States of America and the United Kingdom 
will reveal that although the cartel offence is a necessary measure, it has been 
                                                          
6
 Reena das Nair, Liberty Mncube ‘The role of information exchange in facilitating collusion – 
insights from selected cases’ (2009) South African Competition Commission’s Third Annual 
Competition Conference, 3 September 2009 at 1, available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/presentations-third-annual-competition-conference, accessed on 14 
March 2013.  
7
 s 1(xi)-A firm includes a person, partnership or a trust.  
8
 See Tribunal Consent Order in the matter between the Competition Commission and Lancewood 
Cheese. Tribunal Case No: 103/CR/Dec06. Lancewood Cheese paid an administrative penalty of 
R100 000.00 for its involvement in a milk cartel. 
9
See the Tribunal Consent Order in the matter between the Competition Commission and Foodcorp 
Pty (Ltd) Case No: 50/CR/May08. Foodcorp paid R45 406 359, 82 as an administrative penalty for  
its involvement in a bread cartel. 
10
 Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd case no. 18/CR/Mar01. 
11
 Kelly op cit (n2) at 323. 
12
 GG 32533 of 2009-09-28.  
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prematurely introduced within the South African milieu. More specifically, the 
system has yet to create a harmonised role between the competition authorities and 
the National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”) which as will be discussed has created 
an overlap of functions and is likely to cause discord.
13
  
The most pressing concern is the negative impact the cartel offence will have 
on the Corporate Leniency Policy (“leniency policy”) the most fundamental tool in 
prosecuting cartels as discussed in chapter 3.
14
  The leniency policy grants immunity 
from prosecution to any member of a cartel, in exchange for information regarding 
an on-going cartel.
15
 The leniency policy was developed as a guideline to be used by 
the Commission.
16
 The immunity is conditional and based on the outcome of 
adjudication by the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court.
17
 
Nonetheless, there is a clear incentive to “blow the whistle” on an existing cartel in 
exchange for immunity. It must be noted that the immunity granted by the leniency 
policy, does not extend to criminal liability which the cartel offence seeks to impute 
on directors found guilty of anti-competitive conduct.
18
 It is therefore a natural 
consequence that cartelists will not be willing to make use of the leniency policy, if it 
would translate into criminal liability for their actions. This will drive cartel 
members back into secrecy.  Consequentially, the cartel offence will undermine the 
effectiveness of the leniency policy which has been has been the most significant 
tool for public cartel enforcement.
19
  
It is my contention that South African competition law would be better 
served with a framework that reinforced private cartel enforcement. I submit that 
private cartel enforcement will create a greater deterrent effect than criminal 
sanctions.  The rise in cartel conduct over the years as discussed above has been 
detrimental towards consumers who are subjected to inordinate prices for goods and 
services. The current legislative framework provides that if a complainant wishes to 




 GG 31064 of 2008-05-23.  
15
 Chantal Lavoie ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five-Year Review’, Presented at the 
third annual competition conference, 4 September 2009 at 2, available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/presentations-third-annual-competition-conference, accessed on 12 
March 2013. 
16
 s79 of the Competition Act. 
17
Corporate Leniency Policy para 5.6, available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/CLP-
public-version-12052008.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2013. 
18
 s73A (4) of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. 
19
 Competition Commission ‘Competition Commission Annual Report 2011/2012’ 30 July 2012, 
available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Publications/Annual-Reports/COMPETITION-
COMMISSION-AR11-12-LOW-RESWITH-HYPERLINKS.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2013. 
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bring a claim against a firm for a prohibited practice, the claim can only be 
implemented once the courts find the firm guilty of a prohibited practice.
20
 Once a 
firm’s guilt has been proclaimed in terms of a s65 certificate, the claimant may 
pursue what is referred to as follow-on damages litigation.   
Private competition enforcement against cartels is likely to take the form of 
class actions. Class actions are not a novel experience in South Africa, but they 
would be new within the context of competition law. Access to justice is an issue 
that has taken the fore over the years and class actions are a more inclusive 
procedural mechanism available to consumers. Most importantly, due to the 
overbearing cost of litigation, the contingency fees and the use of the Legal Aid 
Board would ease the financial burden of litigation. The recently certified class 
action, initiated by a class of consumers and a class of bread distributors against the 
bread cartel, is the first private litigation class action to go through the courts. If the 
class action is successful it will create a trajectory for other class actions to follow. 
Chapter 6 will therefore, grapple with the issues surrounding the certification of class 
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ENFORCEMENT AGAINST CARTELS: THE JOURNEY SO FAR 
2.1 Historical Overview of cartels 
A cartel is defined as ‘an agreement or concerted practice among competing firms or 
a decision by an association of firms, to coordinate their competitive behaviour, 
through conduct such as price fixing, division or allocation of markets, and/or 
collusive tendering.’
21
  The nature of cartel conduct can range from an actual 
agreement between firms or some form of co-operative coordination. The result is 
that the firm should have committed one of the prohibited practices mentioned 
above. Cartels by their very nature are based on inimical behaviour. They are a form 
of monopolist that seeks to unilaterally control market power by undermining the 
fundamental concept of a free market economy. By exercising conflicting activities 
that undermine consumer welfare and distort the market, cartels are born and 
continue to flourish. 
The economic history of South Africa has played a role in sustaining cartels. 
It is widely known that some of the basic industries such as postal services, 
telecommunications, electricity were (and are still) owned by the government. 
Therefore, to secure their economic stability, the government maintained a 
protectionist agenda over these industries through the use of cartels.
22
 Monopolies 
and Cartels were thus used by the state as a mechanism to protect sectors which were 
vulnerable and crucial to economic prosperity.
23
 They existed within specific 
parameters and were governed by various government institutions.
24
 The government 
in particular, has been involved in providing subsidies to industries such as steel, 
agriculture and fuel; relatively strategic industries which contributed to economic 
growth during that time.
25
  
                                                          
21
 Supra (n17) para 5.1. 
22
 Department of Trade and Industry Pretoria ‘Proposed Guidelines for Competition Policy – A 
framework for Competition, Competitiveness and Development’ 27 November 1997 para 3, available 
at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/ProposedGuidelinesforCompetitionPolicy.htm, accessed on 




 Supra (n22) para 3. 
25
 Nompucuko Nontombana, Itumeleng Lesofe ‘Do cartelists change behaviour post-investigations’ 
Fourth Annual Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal  
and Mandela Institute Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy in South Africa, 2 
September 2010 at 3, available at http://www.compcom.co.za/fourth-competition-law-conference/, 
accessed on 12 March 2013. 
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Cartels on a global spectrum have been in existence for a relatively lengthy 
period of time and can be traced back to the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century.
26
  Historically speaking, cartels enjoyed a positive status in other 
jurisdictions. In Germany cartels were the product of economic uncertainty.
27
 Faced 
with competition from Britain and a desire to expand territorially, Germany looked 
to cartels as a strategy to protect its economy.
28
 Cartels became a strategic move in 
facilitating economic growth and power.
29
 Estimates illustrate that there were only 4 
cartels in Germany in 1865 and the numbers increased to 1,000 by the end of the 




To ensure economic prosperity after the depression that lasted from 1873-
1896, Germany undertook a protectionist agenda.
31
 Concepts such as “consumer 
choice” and “economic freedom” were non-existent; ‘consumers were largely 
identified as workers whose interests were represented by the growing trade union 
movements.’
32
 As a result, the need for a regulatory framework was absent, a 
sentiment the German legislature later regretted. It was only in the early twentieth 
century that the need for competition emerged, evidenced by inflated prices and 
growing public concern.
33
 The cartels that had built economic power had now 
become the root cause of economic instability. It was from this era that a regulatory 
framework developed and competition enforcement re-emerged as an economic 
necessity in Germany. The impetus to create a free economy, gave rise to the 
European commission’s cartel policy.  
The South African Government was equally having difficulties when some of 
the protected industries were scrutinised for anti-competitive practices that proved 
detrimental to economic growth. A legislative framework, that would adequately 
address anti-competitive conduct, needed to be developed with quite some urgency.
34
 
                                                          
26
 Lee McGowan The Antitrust Revolution in Europe, Exploring the European Commission’s Cartel 
Policy (2010) 46. 
27






 McGowan op cit (n26) 48. 
31
 McGowan op cit (n26) 49. 
32
 McGowan op cit (n26) 52. 
33
McGowan op cit (n26) 53. 
34
 Supra (n22) para 3.2. 
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The Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act
35
  was the first piece of legislation 
that addressed monopolistic conditions within South Africa. When the Board of 
Trade and Industries (which later became the Competition Commission), was 
formulated over two decades ago, its goal was to tackle monopolistic structural 
conditions and anti-competitive conduct within the South African economy.
36
  
During the early years of the Board of Trade and Industries a majority of the 
cases investigated revealed that monopolistic conditions were prevalent in basic 
necessities such as groceries, books, cigarettes and newspapers.
37
  However, not all 
monopolies were regarded as negative, some monopolistic conditions were 
necessary. This position was equally endorsed by the German government who 
undertook a protectionist agenda by allowing certain cartels to exist in their most 
vulnerable sectors of the economy as previously discussed. The board however, 
made it clear that they did not accept monopolistic practices such as price 
agreements, fixed trade discounts, resale price maintenance and exclusive deals 
made with suppliers and dealers.
38
 Therefore, the Maintenance and Promotion of 
Competition Act
39
 was promulgated with the hopes of addressing the weaknesses of 
The Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act.  
The Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act failed to prohibit anti-
competitive conduct; it was frequently challenged on substantive and technical 
grounds.
40
 This undermined the effectiveness of the prohibitions and failed to 
address the monopolistic conditions that undermined the market. It was amidst these 




2.2 The Current Legislative Approach 
The Commission is the driving force in combating anti-competitive conduct. It is the 
public statutory body entrusted with investigating, controlling and evaluating 
restrictive business practices in the South African market.
42
 It enjoys broad 
                                                          
35
 The Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act 24 of 1955. 
36










 Gertrude Makhaya,Wendy Mkwananzi & Simon Roberts ‘How should  young institutions approach 
competition enforcement? Reflections on South Africa's experience’ (2012) 19 South African Journal 
of International Affairs 43 at 45. 
42
 See www.compcom.co.za, accessed on 1 July 2013. 
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investigative powers that facilitate the prosecution of cartels.
43
 Their powers 
specifically enable them to interrogate directors, employees and any other 
individuals involved/related to the prohibited conduct.
44
 Once the Commission has 
completed its investigation it may refer the matter to the Competition Tribunal.
45
 The 
Competition Tribunal is the statutory adjudicative body which determines whether 
the conduct of a firm is prohibited in terms of Chapter 2 of the Act.
46
 If it is not, the 
Commission issues a notice of non-referral to the complainant.
47
 
The Commission is equipped with three main tools to combat cartelisation; 
s4(1)(b) provision, the leniency policy and administrative penalties. This discussion 
will focus on s4(1)(b) and highlight some of the challenges faced in its interpretation 
and implementation. An examination of the leniency policy and administrative 
penalties will follow in Chapter 3. 
The Competition Tribunal determines whether a firm is guilty of prohibited 
practice in terms of s4(1)(b). When a firm is found guilty of a prohibited practice, it 
imposes an administrative penalty or additionally, any other order it deems fit.
48
 
Section 4(1)(b) of the Act specifically prohibits the following: 
An agreement between, or a concerted practice by, firms or a decision by an association of 
firms’ between parties in a horizontal relationship and if it involves any of the following 
restrictive horizontal practices: 
(i) directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition; 
(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods 
or services; or 
(iii) collusive tendering. 
 
Section 4(1)(b) forms the apex in establishing whether a firm is guilty of 
cartel conduct. The tribunal/courts are mandated to take a step-by-step inquiry to 
determine whether the conduct identified meets the requirements of the provision.  In 
order to understand the framework in which s4(1)(b) operates, the definitional 
components of s4(1)(b) will be canvassed below. 
The definition above begins by highlighting three different forms of co-
operation; an agreement, a concerted practice or a decision by an association of 
firms. The Act was drafted to separate collusive or coordinated acts and acts 
                                                          
43













undertaken by individuals for their own benefit.
49
 Therefore, the emphasis on these 
distinctions is predicated on the necessity of determining which firms partake in 
prohibited practices and to avoid implicating firms which are not inherently 
collusive.   
An agreement and a concerted practice are mutually exclusive terms. An 
agreement is defined in the Act as a ‘practice, [which] includes a contract, [an] 
arrangement or [an] understanding, whether or not legally enforceable.’
50
  A 
concerted practice on the other hand [refers to] co-operative, or coordinated conduct 
between firms, achieved through direct or indirect contact, that replaces their 
independent action, but which does not amount to an agreement.’
51
  Therefore, cartel 
conduct can range from an express agreement between firms to some form of co-
operative coordination. The Act does not define what a competitor is but, it is safe to 
conclude that it refers to firms that compete and operate in the same line of 
business.
52
 A restrictive horizontal practice can be described as: 
[A]rchetypal anti-competitive acts which encompass the acquisitions and abuse of market 
power through the co-operative acts of competitors. They therefore occur where competitors 




 It must be noted that because cartel conduct is regarded as the most 
egregious form of anti-competitive conduct, it is a per se prohibition. A per se 
prohibition refers to conduct that is out rightly prohibited. The principle, which 
derives from the United States, is referred to as a per se prohibition because 
‘experience has shown that they mostly have serious anti-competitive effects and can 
almost never have redeeming features.’
 54
 The mere existence of the conduct is 
sufficient to constitute a contravention of s4(1)(b). It does not require one to 
establish that it is not anti-competitive nor can it be justified by the guilty parties. 
Once, the above definitional components are met, one needs to determine 
whether the firm is guilty of price-fixing, market allocation or collusive tendering. A 
finding of guilt is subject to the evidence acquired through the investigation launched 
by the Commission. Once their investigations are completed, the matter is referred to 
the Competition Tribunal for adjudication. 
                                                          
49
 Philip Sutherland, Katharine Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2000) 5-9. 
50




 American Soda Ash Corp v Competition Commission 12/CAC/Dec0 at 24.  
53
 J Neethling Unlawful Competition 2ed (2008) 29. 
54
 Ibid at 31. 
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2.2.1 Section 4 (1)(b) 
(i) Price Fixing 
‘Price fixing is inimical to economic competition, and has no place in a sound 
economy.’
55
 It goes against a fundamental competition principle of promoting a free 
market economy. Therefore, because price fixing by its very nature distorts the 
market by manipulating it, it is automatically regarded as prohibited conduct.
56
 




The Act envisions two forms of price fixing; direct and indirect. Direct price 
fixing can take the form of an express agreement on prices to be charged on various 
products and specific discounts to be offered to customers. Indirect price fixing 
refers to the indirect coordination of prices.
58
 In American Soda Ash Corp v 
Competition Commission
59
 the court held that the creation of an alter ego of a 
competitor is a form of indirect price fixing. The alter ego of the firm undertook 
certain functions of the main business entity.
60
  If upon scrutinizing this alter ego, it 
is discovered that there is price-fixing, then the competitor would not be able to 
maintain the façade any longer.
61
 The common thread of both forms of price fixing is 
that the information exchanged between cartel members contributes to direct/indirect 
price fixing. Today, associations and boards act as the disseminators of information 
regarding various markets. The frequent exchange of information through pricing 




 In 2009, the Commission investigated the petrochemicals industry for price 





 was one of the firms investigated for being in a restricted horizontal 
relationship that resulted in prices being fixed for the sale of base bitumen and 
                                                          
55
 Sutherland & Kemp op cit (n49) 5-20. 
56
 National Society of Professional Engineers v United States 435 US 679 (1978) at 692. 
57
 Sutherland & Kemp op cit (n49) 5-45. 
58
 Ibid at 5-47. 
59






 Whish op cit (n3) 5. 
63
 Competition Commission v Southern African Bitumen Association 06/CR/MAR10. 
64
 Sasol was in a restrictive horizontal relationship with Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd, Engen Limited, Shell 





 The petrochemicals companies had adopted a pricing 
mechanism based on the Wholesale List Setting Price. The List was applied by oil 
companies when they enjoyed an exemption until 2000 when the exemption was 
withdrawn.
66
 The exemption (a remnant of the protectionist agenda) allowed 
companies to jointly calculate prices for bitumen based on the list.
67
 The pricing 




The petrochemicals companies contained their price-fixing through monthly 
exchanges of information through the South African Petroleum Industry Association. 
The information exchanged whether aggregated or not, has the likelihood of being 
collusive/anti-competitive if the exchange is based on private communications 
associated with prices and plans.
69
 The petrochemicals industry was found guilty of 
price fixing and the South African Bitumen Industry Association confirmed its role 
in the discussions which led to price fixing.
70
  
The case brought to light the prevalence and the effect of information 
exchange. The current competition framework does not specifically address 
information exchange, but it could be regarded as a form of indirect price fixing.
71
 
Information exchange leads to indirect price fixing by enabling greater transparency 
between the pricing practices of firms. The unpredictability of the market (which is 
fundamental in maintaining a competitive environment) is removed. Therefore in an 
environment where there are very few competitors and there is production of 
homogenous products, indirect price fixing is bound to occur as a consequence of 
information exchange. Perhaps information exchange should be regarded as an anti-
competitive practice on its own, if it can be illustrated that it directly contributes to 
anti-competitive practices. 
(ii) Market Allocation 
Market allocation refers to the division of markets between competitors.
72
 In 
practice, firms allocate specific markets to competitors or potential competitors and 
                                                          
65
 Commission v Bitumen supra (n63) para 2.2. 
66




 Ibid para 2.4.3.  
69
 Das Nair & Mncube op cit (n6) at 14. 
70
 Commission v Bitumen supra (n63) at 4.1. 
71
 Das Nair & Mncube op cit (n6) at 10. 
72
 Malefo v StreetPole Ads (SA) (Pty) Ltd 35/IR/May05. 
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these competitors are able to exercise market control in their designated markets. 
However, it is not mandatory to establish market control to establish that market 
allocation has occurred. One only needs to illustrate that there has been a division of 
the market and it is automatically presumed to be harmful.
73
  
A relatively controversial case that South African competition law drew from 
with regard to this aspect, is United States v Topco Association.
74
 A group of grocers 
had sought to promote products under the Topco brand name.
75
 As part of the 
agreement they were required to sell Topco products in their allocated area and they 
could still compete with other non-Topco products.
76
 The objective of the agreement 
was to allow for the promotion of Topco products in a certain area, without the 
imposition of other Topco product sellers interfering in that market.
77
 The court 




The judgment was criticized for being too stringent because it failed to 
consider the underlying purpose of the conduct of the parties involved.
79
 It was 
suggested that the courts should examine cases of this nature with more flexibility 
and assess the true effects of the parties conduct to determine whether it is anti-
competitive.
80
 If the stringent approach adopted by the court in Topco is maintained 
it may actually push firms into cartel activity because economic development 
remains unsupported. It is an approach that can be considered to prevent the 
undermining of pro-competitive strategies undertaken by firms to increase economic 
productivity.  
 However, the greatest advantage of per se prohibitions is that it reduces the 
evidentiary burden on Competition Authorities. For resource stricken jurisdictions, 
conducting an economic analysis to prove anti-competitive conduct is difficult. It is 
likely to create a tipped scale in favour of cartelists due to their ability to afford a 
highly specialised legal team and experts. Therefore, it is a slippery slope but one 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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(iii) Collusive Tendering 
Collusive tendering or bid rigging as it is commonly referred to in the United States 
of America, occurs when firms agree on the conditions for tendering or supplying of 
a specific commodity in response to a call for tenders.
81
 Collusive tendering can be 
described as another form of market allocation.
82
 It is manifested in different forms 
and can also lead to price fixing. It is regarded as a per se prohibition; it contributes 
to the distortion of the market and undermines competition. There are four main 
methods of collusive tendering:
83
 
i. Bid suppression: certain companies agree to refrain or withdraw from the 
tender procedure. 
ii. Complementary bidding: certain members of the cartel agree to submit 
high bids to give an appearance of competition. 
iii. Bid rotation: all the members submit tenders, but take turns to be the lowest 
and winning tender. 
iv. Sub-contracting: the winning company spreads some of the spoils, by 
sub-contracting part of the work to losing bidders.  
2.3 Conclusion 
A collective assessment of s4(1)(b) and its application indicates that there are some 
notable challenges faced in its interpretation. The historical account discussed above 
indicates the importance of s4(1)(b) and the critical role it plays in facilitating a 
competitive environment. The existence of a highly concentrated market, high entry 
level barriers and relatively homogenous products are the main characteristics of 
South Africa’s market.  It is this structural component which contributes to the ease 
with which firms collude. The importation of information exchange into the 
legislative framework as a prohibited practice could contribute to reinforcing the 
reach of s4(1)(b). The challenges presented, represent the naturalia of a developing 
jurisprudence and it would be suffice to say that the implementation of s4(1)(b) has 
made significant strides in addressing cartel conduct thus far. 
 
 
                                                          
81
 SA Metal & Machinery Co v Cape Town Iron & Steel Works 1997 (1) SA 319 (A) 324. 
82
 Sutherland & Kemp op cit (n49) at 5-59. 
83
 The Official Newsletter of the Competition Commission ‘Competition News’ 1 September 2001 at 
2, available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Sept-01-
Newsletter.pdf, accessed on 12 March 2013. 
20 
 
CHAPTER 3  
THE CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 
The enforcement against cartels has assumed a more globalized tone in recent years. 
The common thread between various jurisdictions is the leniency policy; adopted as 
the successful ‘carrot-and-stick strategy’ in public cartel enforcement.
84
 The policy 
creates a highly tempting deal to cartelists by offering them immunity from the one 
thing they fear; prosecution. To begin to understand the leniency policy an 
examination of its fundamental tenants will be canvassed below.  
3.1 The Theory of leniency 
 In economic and sociological circles, cartels can be loosely understood as an 
unstable organization.
85
 The modus operandi of this organization is not based on a 
memorandum of incorporation or articles of association but, on what is colloquially 
termed as a truce.
86
 When firms collude they cooperate in order to obtain a mutual 
benefit. However, the incentive to collude is polarised by a single firm’s private 
incentive to abandon the cooperative strategy for its own personal gains.
87
 It must 
also be understood that the level of involvement in a cartels ranges from the core to 
“ring-leaders” who regulate the cartel through diplomacy, intimidation or even 
punitive measures.
88
 The fictional alliance between cartel members is therefore born 
from self-interest and the continued pursuit of it.
89
  
This unique business relationship has served as a topic of interest for 
economists and sociologists who have sought to apply the “game theory” or the 
“prisoners dilemma”
90
 both reminiscent of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt 
analogy. What both theories suggest is that one can determine how cartelists make 
decisions when confronted with choices that will affect their interests, in highly 
competitive conditions.
91
 a cartel relationship is maintained on the premise that the 
benefits (profit) obtained will outweigh the cost (prosecution). Once a cartel is in 
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existence it is the cost/benefit analysis which will take the fore and remain the prime 
enforcer of the relationship. The continuity of a cartel is thus based on maintaining 
this tipped scale.  
The leniency policy is thus based on a combination of the prison dilemma 
and the theory of pre-emption. The theory suggests that a member imbibed with fear, 
pre-empts the other cartel members and applies for leniency.
 92
 It is in the face of 
hostility and adversity that the carrot and stick strategy i.e. the leniency policy has 
gained momentum by dangling a succulent carrot on a stick. 
3.2 South African Corporate Leniency Policy 
The adoption of the leniency policy in 2004 bridged the gap that existed prior to its 
adoption. Before the leniency policy very few collusive practices were prosecuted 
because most anticompetitive complaints were centre on the abuse of dominance and 
mergers and acquisitions.
93
  In addition, the Commission was faced with the 
challenge that cartels are secretive in nature and uncovering their existence was 
difficult without an effective measure to draw them out.
94
  
The leniency policy offers immunity from an administrative penalty to any 
member of a cartel who comes forward and “blows the whistle” on an existing cartel 
by disclosing any and all relevant information to the Commission.
95
  The policy is 
available and limited to practices prohibited in s4(1)(b). It is only applicable to 
“firms” as defined in the Act and must be distinguished from s 44 of the Act read 
with Rule 14(1) (b) which protects individuals who blow the whistle.  
What the policy seeks to create is the so-called Prisoners Dilemma or stag 
hunt as discussed, by creating conditions that contribute to de-stabilising the cartel. 
The carrot is made more succulent by only granting immunity to the first cartelist to 
the door. This forms one of 4 salient features which form the core of the leniency 
policy which will be discussed below.
96
  However, the leniency policy provides an 
additional “get-out-of-jail-free-card” by granting subsequent cartelists who approach 
the Commission, a reduced penalty or alternative remedies at the Commission’s 
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 The “get-out-of-jail-free-card” may be the incentive that other cartelists 
need to break the fold and approach the Commission.  
3.2.1 First to the door 
The “first to the door” approach grants the first member of a cartel to approach the 
Commission, conditional immunity in exchange for evidence of an on-going cartel.
98
 
If the applicant is successful, they will not face any prosecution nor be subject to a 
fine.
99
 The feature creates a pull of pre-emption and it is for that reason that 
subsequent applications from other cartel members are not eligible for immunity.
100
 
The applications themselves need careful consideration and therefore merely 
approaching the Commission does not equate to automatic immunity. The 
Commission thoroughly assesses the information provided by the applicant to 
determine whether they are eligible for conditional immunity. Various factors are 
considered to determine the importance of the information provided, including ‘the 
level at which a [leniency] application is made’ and this could include whether a firm 
is a subsidiary or a parent company.
101
  
The marker system reinforces the pull of pre-emption of the leniency policy 
by enabling a cartel member, prior to making a leniency application, to reserve their 
position in the race to the door.
102
 It almost acts like a reservation at a restaurant; you 
are guaranteed a seat at the table without being mandated to pay for the meal yet. 
The Commission, at their discretion, approves the marker application and gives the 
applicant a deadline in which to provide the requisite information in accordance 
with.
103
 Once the applicant has provided the evidence and any other information 
necessary to enable an investigation, the application for immunity will be deemed to 
have been requested on the date the marker application was submitted.
104
 Therefore, 
the system creates a greater incentive for cartelists to come forward. 
It has been debated whether subsequent applications by other cartelists 
should be eligible for partial immunity.
105
 The debate is premised on whether second 
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or third applicants should be granted conditional immunity for their cooperation. The 
leniency policy could benefit from a more balanced approach which entails a 
combination of the “first to the door” approach and partial leniency towards the 
second and third applicants.
106
 Although such a proposition is likely to diminish the 




3.2.2 Admission of contravention of the act 
Once the nature and the type of the application is established, cartel conduct must be 
identified.
108
 This assessment entails determining whether the conduct is in 
contravention of s4(1)(b) of the Act and what role the cartelist played within the 
cartel. The applicant is required to admit contravening certain provisions of the 
Act.
109
 This requires full and honest disclosure of information and any other 
evidence that would assist the Commission in its investigation.
110
 The applicant will 
be required to cease all cartel activity immediately and must not inform other cartel 
members of their application.
111
 Upon receipt of the application, the Commissioner 
will examine it to determine whether the information would qualify the applicant for 
immunity.  
As discussed above, ‘the applicant must offer full and expeditious co-
operation to the Commission concerning the reported cartel activity,’ therefore full 
disclosure is essential in making a leniency application.
112
 The failure to fully co-
operate can result in an increased administrative penalty as exemplified by Sasol 
Ltd’s settlement penalty which was increased from 6% to 8% due to the failure to 




3.2.3 Cartel activity Covered by the corporate leniency policy 
The leniency policy is specifically for cartel activities which have had an effect in 
South Africa.
114
 Immunity is granted for separate cartel activities and does not 
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provide blanket immunity for all prohibited activities.
115
 The policy is aimed at cartel 
activity which the Commission a) is unaware of; b) is aware of and has yet to 
investigate due to lack of information or; c) is currently investigating but has 
insufficient information to prosecute.
116
 The leniency policy recognises that some 
firms may engage in cartel conduct unaware of its illegality and that some cartelists 
may refuse to disclose critical information, due to the possible consequences they 
could face from other cartel members.
117
 Therefore, the leniency policy also enables 
a certain level of anonymity with regard to applications thereby enabling cartels to 
safely approach the Commission without fear of prosecution by the courts or 
persecution from other cartel members 
3.2.4 Conditional Immunity 
Conditional immunity is granted at the outset of the application pending the 
finalisation of the case.
118
 The applicant is assured conditional immunity through a 
written contract on the grounds that the information they provided is enough to assist 
with the investigation and to prosecute the cartel.
119
 In addition the applicant must 
have met all the conditions set by the leniency policy throughout the proceedings.
120
 
Once the case has been finalised by the tribunal/appeal court, the Commission will 
then decide to give the applicant full immunity or none at all. During the court 
proceedings, the Commission maintains the right of withdrawing immunity if the 
applicant fails to meet the conditions associated with leniency.
121
 
  It is debatable whether the Commission should develop the leniency policy to 
create a distinction between leniency applications prior to an investigation and post 
the inception of an investigation. This is in comparison to the leniency policy in 
other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) 
which specifically distinguishes between applications pre and post the inception of 
an investigation.
122
 The applicant who applies post the inception of an investigation 
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is eligible for immunity from penalties or a reduction of the administrative penalty of 
up to 100%.
123
 The distinction between the two is clear and creates the necessary 
incentive for cartelists to come forward. 
The leniency policy since being amended in 2008 has opened the gates for 
more leniency applications. These amendments have made the policy more 
effective.
124
 First, the amendment has allowed more legal certainty by removing the 
opaque decision-making process in exchange for transparency through the removal 
of discretionary powers exercised by the Commission with regard to applications.
125
 
Secondly, the policy has been extended to allow any member of a cartel, be it the 
leaders or instigators, to be able to apply for immunity.
126
 The aspired result is 
increasing the level of distrust within a cartel and creating room for more members 
to approach the Commission.
127
 Thirdly, applicants may submit evidence orally 
which limits the possibility of giving the Commission documentary evidence which 
can be used against them in proceedings in other courts.
128
 Lastly, the process has 
been streamlined by assigning the Enforcement & Exemptions Division of the 
Commission as the body which deals with all leniency applications.
129
 
The measures above clearly indicate a radical policy which has incentivised 
members of cartels to come forward. In addition the policy has streamlined 
prosecutions by reducing the number of cases and promoting more settlements. It is 
clearly a very effective tool in combating cartel conduct.  
3.3 Administrative penalties and their under deterrent nature 
The current competition policy, manifested in s 4(1)(b) of the Act which  prohibits 





 or collusive tendering,
132
 was  born from the need to urgently address 
the prevalence of cartel conduct which  negatively affects the market. Thus far, this 
has been achieved through the imposition of monetary administrative penalties 
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(capped at 10% of a firm’s annual turnover)
133
 on firms found guilty of anti-
competitive conduct. The adjudicative system is thus characterised by a somewhat 
complex system of administrative penalties, discounts and factors
134
 to be considered 
by the courts when imposing penalties. Determining an administrative penalty 
requires the courts to strike a precarious balance; to deter the cartel from recidivist 
behaviour and impose an administrative penalty which would not cripple the firm 
financially. Therefore, while many consumers would take pleasure in the complete 
demise of cartels through administrative penalties, there is the overarching necessity 
of maintaining economic efficiency which the 10% cap seeks to protect.  
Consequentially, administrative penalties are generally under deterrent. 
 
3.3.1 Settlements 
At the heart of the Commission’s work are administrative penalties, the only 
deterrent at the Commission’s disposal. Penalties are imposed through settlements or 
through litigation. A settlement agreement is similar to an admission of guilt in 
criminal law; the agreement is concluded between a cartelist and the Commission for 
admitting guilt to contravening the Act.
135
 The settlement agreement is then 
confirmed by the Competition Tribunal.
136
 The Commission is empowered to 
determine a justified penalty which can be up to 10% of a firm’s annual turnover in 
the preceding financial year.
137
 The settlement process has proven to be an 
expeditious and effective process as evidence by the fast track settlement process.
138
 
Settlements by their nature result in lesser administrative penalties than those 
imposed through the Tribunal/Court.
 139
 Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd settled with a fine 
which was less than the 10% cap it would have faced had it continued contesting the 
claim.
140
 The settlement agreement was just under R1billion and could have 
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amounted to more had the matter been finalised by the Tribunal.
141
 The conclusion 
drawn from this is that settlements do seem to create the necessary incentive for 
cartels to settle but should that be at the cost of achieving proportionality in 
penalties? An examination of administrative penalties imposed through litigation 
may better illuminate the pragmatism of the settlement process.  
3.3.2 Administrative penalties imposed through litigation 
An administrative penalty is a fine that may not be more than 10% of the annual 
turnover earned within the Republic of South Africa in the preceding financial 
year.
142
 The first ever financial penalty to be administered by the Competition 
Tribunal was in Competition Commission v Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern 
Africa (Pty) Ltd. 
143
 It was a historic moment for the administration of financial 
penalties but, the beginning of a relatively uncertain exercise. Penalties are regarded 
as a deterrent against cartelisation. It is hoped that if cartels are aware of the 
magnitude of the financial penalties, they are less likely to partake in that conduct.  
The court in Southern Pipeline Contractors and Conrite Wals (Pty)Ltd v 
Competition Commission
144
aptly described the approach that should be applied when 
imposing administrative penalties as follows: 
[A] penalty which is of a criminal nature should be proportional in severity to the degree of 
blameworthiness of the offending party, the nature of the offence and its effect on the South 
African economy in general and consumers in particular...the imposition of an administrative 
penalty should not only promote the important objective of deterrence but that sight should 
not be lost of fairness to the offending party. In particular, a penalty should not be imposed 
in order to destroy the business of the offending party, a point confirmed by s59(2) which 
places a cap on the amount of a penalty which may be imposed; that is it cannot exceed 10% 
of the offending firm’s annual turnover in the Republic and its exports during that firm’s 
preceding financial year. 
 
The Act is a regulatory document. Consequentially, it subscribes to the 
constitutional dispensation which calls for an interpretation that is in line with the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights.
145
 Therefore, penalties cannot be 
imposed wilfully but must be given a more equitable interpretation.
146
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June – May of the following year as per the judgment of The Competition Commission and Federal 
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Administrative penalties share similarities with criminal penalties as highlighted in 
Southern Pipeline Contractors and therefore, the element of proportionality must 
remain at the fore of their imposition.
147
 Therefore, the 10% cap which s59(2) 
requires on a firm’s annual turnover, creates the maximum penalty which can be 
imposed on a firm after considering the factors in s59(3). For the purposes of this 
discussion it is not necessary to delve into the details of the courts adjudicative 
process but rather to acquire a general understanding of how the process is applied 
and how effective it is. 
The legal framework does not provide a definitive guide on how 
administrative penalties are to be enforced and consequentially the courts apply their 
own discretion. Once a) contravention of s4(1)(b has been identified, economic harm 
is presumed and the courts need only consider the factors listed in s59(3)
148
, 
evidence presented, mitigating and aggravating factors. In Competition Commission 
v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd
149
 the court attempted to provide a guideline for 
this process.  There are by no means hard and fast rules applicable to future cases 
but, they served as the apex of this type of enquiry. The Southern Pipeline 
Contractors judgment represented a departure from the guidelines established in 
South African Airways. The court based its assessment on the annual turnover of the 
firm as opposed to the affected turnover (turnover directly derived from the 
prohibited activities).
150
 The result was a huge disparity between penalties imposed 
on the “annual turnover” which is much larger than the “affected turnover” and 
which may constitute a very small percentage of the annual turnover.  
South African Airways judgment indicates that this is still a relatively vexing 
exercise for the courts because it breeds a level of uncertainty in determining 
penalties. The lack of a standardised and certain process creates the possibility of 
inequitable penalties being imposed.  
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The court in Competition Commission v Aveng (Africa) Limited t/a 
Steeldale
151
 highlighted that its approach to administrative penalties has been to 
borrow principles from other jurisdictions most notably the EU to apply in 
conjunction with s59(3).
152
 A six-step approach was developed and applied by the 
Competition Tribunal and is as follows:
153
 
Step one: determination of the affected turnover in the relevant year of 
assessment. 
Step two: calculation of the ‘base amount,’ being that proportion of the 
relevant turnover relied upon. 
Step three: where the contravention exceeds one year, multiplying the 
amount obtained in step 2 by the duration of the contravention. 
Step four: rounding off the figure obtained in step 3, if it exceeds the cap 
provided for by section 59(2). 
Step five: considering factors that might mitigate or aggravate the amount 
reached in step 4, by way of a discount or premium expressed as a percentage 
of that amount that is either subtracted from or added to it. 
Step six: rounding off this amount if it exceeds the cap provided for in 
section 59(2). If it does, it must be adjusted downwards so that it does not 
exceed the cap, as explained by the CAC in Southern Pipeline Contractors.  
The guidelines above were developed by the Tribunal in Aveng. The general 
approach has been to apply s59(3) without exceeding the statutory cap. Even if a 
firms conduct may warrant an administrative penalty exceeding the 10% cap, s59(2) 
prevents it and creates a formidable challenge in achieving the deterrent effect. What 
compounds this problem is the differing approaches applied in each case, which 
resulted in a 50% reduction in administrative penalties imposed on two firms who 
were guilty of contravening s4(1)(b).
154
 The fines were reduced from R16 882 to R 8 
720 000.00 597.00 and R 6 192 457.00 to R 2 037 070.00. The reduction was a result 
of differing considerations in calculating the penalty; notably there was no indication 
that the Competition Appeal Court had considered the appellants active involvement 
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in the cartel for 13 years.
155
  The judgment is indicative of how regressive the 
process can be. A penalty of R6 192 457.00 for actively participating in a cartel for 
13 years does not seem to meet the proportionality principle nor does it create a 
deterrence.  
The incongruence of the policy and the desired effects constrain the creation 
of the necessary competitive conditions which the prisoner’s dilemma calls for. 
Economic theory suggests that to achieve an optimal penalty two factors must be 
considered: economic harm and the unlawful gains by the offender.
156
 Instead, the 
imposition of penalties fails to consider the harm or the gains, but is centred on 
‘[applying] a number of rules to approximate the effects.’
157
  Another more 
significant consideration is that of allocative efficiency. A competitive market 
promotes consumer welfare by ensuring firms which cannot survive in a competitive 
market are expelled to promote efficiency and consumer welfare.
158
 This is 
inherently a natural safeguard which protects consumer welfare. Allocative 
efficiency thus propels firms towards productive efficiency, innovation and a general 
equilibrium within the market. 
Cartels as is their nature create an artificial market which enables inefficient 
firms to thrive.
159
 However, once this artificial market is dissolved and the penalties 
have been imposed and the firm is unable to survive the market, it deserves to be 
removed from the market.
160
 As Motto describes it, ‘[the] process of Darwinian 
selection is good,’
161
 a sentiment which most consumers would share. As mentioned 
before, if penalties are proportional to the harm, the guilty firms are likely to be 
liquidated due to the financial burden the penalties create. Once again, the 
competition authorities find themselves on a slippery slope.  
 Nonetheless, ‘deterrence through the use of fines will work, if and only if, 
from the perspective of the company contemplating whether or not to commit a 
violation, the expected fine exceeds the expected gain from violation.’
162
  The status 
quo has illustrated that administrative penalties do not create the desired deterrent 
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effect and although the leniency policy remains the most effective tool it will be 
meaningless once the Amendment Act
163
 which will criminalise cartels, is 
promulgated. The Amendment Act will hold directors criminal liability for a fine of 
up to R500, 000 fine or up to 10 years imprisonment. Cartelists will be less likely to 
risk criminal liability and this will undermine the incentive created by the leniency 
policy. What would be more beneficial is a revision of the leniency policy with the 
amendment in mind. Perhaps, the Amendment could be extended to include 
immunity from criminal prosecution which albeit may actually undermine the 
amendment itself. Nonetheless, a harmonious regulatory framework is necessary to 
ensure efficiency in combating cartels while increasing the desired deterrent effect. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The Commission undoubtedly has a difficult task in playing the “cartel police” if one 
can attribute them to that role. A closer look at the framework reveals unclear 
standards of analysis for administrative penalties which could unravel the progress 
that has been made thus far. The leniency policy, which will soon resemble a stick 
without a carrot, will lose the pre-empting effect it had once cartels are criminalised.  
An assessment of the status quo is indicative of a cyclical pattern in which 
cartels are punished with penalties and “released” back into the economy where they 
are allowed to continue flourishing. Unfortunately, the system remains relatively 
reactive. With cartel numbers on the rise and the looming amendment (which is 
bound to plunge them back into secrecy) the penalties have become part and parcel 
of the cost of doing business. Consequentially, the deterrent effect sought by 
administering penalties is slowly becoming obviated.  Although criminalisation has 
worked in other jurisdictions such as the United States, I submit that it is a premature 
exercise in South Africa as will be discussed in the following chapter. Emphasis 
should be placed on empowering consumers to counteract anticompetitive behaviour 
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A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CARTEL OFFENCE 
4.1. The Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 
The introduction of s73A into South African Competition Law has been met with 
resistance and in some instances outright anathema.
164
 Some have even described it 
as a badly advised piece of legislation.
165
The Law Society of South Africa in its 
submission to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry provided that the cartel 
offence would ‘hinder the investigation of cartels and should be replaced by personal 
sanctions.’
166
 In favour of the South African business community, Business Unity 
South Africa submitted to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry ‘that the 
Competition Amendment Bill would unfavourably increase the scope of criminal 
liability for company directors in terms of uncompetitive business practice as mere 
knowledge of anti-competitive behaviour would now constitute [a] criminal 
offence.’
167
 The Amendment, which was passed over two years ago and signed by 
the president, has yet to come into force. The Amendment Act will introduce several 
amendments to the existing Competition Act. The amendments are as follows
168
:  
1.) Concurrent Jurisdiction over competition matters; 
2.) Complex Monopolies; 
3.) Market Inquiries;169 
4.) Personal Responsibility of directors and officers of firms; and  
5.) Leniency for whistleblowers – this will provide a complete amendment of the 
Commission’s Corporate Leniency Policy. 
The amendments are meant to supplement and reinforce the competition 
framework which as discussed, has been heavily reliant on the leniency policy and 
administrative penalties. However, as mentioned, the Amendment Act was not 
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promulgated due to various objections which among other things related to the 
unconstitutionality of various provisions; this will be expanded on in the following 
chapter. 
Section 73A will, upon promulgation, criminalise cartel conduct and in essence 
establish a cartel offence.  Section 73A provides that  
‘a director of a firm who is in a position of authority commits an offence if they engage in a 
prohibited practice in terms of [s 4(1)(b)] or knowingly [acquiesces] to said prohibited practice.'  
Personal sanctions against directors will include a fine of up to R500, 000 and/or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years.
170
 The provision essentially 
pierces the corporate veil, a concept which was vehemently objected to in company 
law until it was legislated recently.
171
 Most importantly for the South African 
competition authorities, it will undermine the strength of the leniency policy; the 
commissions main tool for cartel enforcement.
172
Therefore, from the outset the 
introduction of a cartel offence has been met with disdain and is not exactly regarded 
as the saving-grace for public competition enforcement.  
Formulating an effective criminal framework for cartel activity in South Africa 
will require the consideration of varying elements, the most pertinent being the 
protection of the leniency policy. The current framework does not guarantee that 
cartelists will be apprehended for partaking in prohibited anticompetitive conduct. It 
is for that reason, that the general penalty for cartel conduct should be increased to 
off-set the diminished chance of detection and criminal prosecution as will be 
touched on at a later stage.
173
 This cost-benefit analysis/proportionality assessment 
should be extended to prosecutorial authorities; to ensure that enforcement is 
economically feasible through the careful selection of which cases are prosecuted.
174
  
As touched on in previous chapters, price-fixing, market allocation and bid-
rigging are inefficient cartel activities which do not contribute to consumer welfare. 
As a result, there are no economic gains received from cartel activities. 
Consequentially, legislative enforcement should be geared towards penalties that 
strike a balance between conveying the disdain for cartel activity and the principle of 
proportionality. 
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4.2 The Cartel Offence, an appropriate remedy? 
Cartels on a global scale share similar characteristics and it is this homogeneity 
that has enabled various jurisdictions to draw from other legal frameworks in 
employing remedies to deal with cartel activity. The cartel offence has formed the 
centre of many debates among competition enforcers and scholars as an effective 
remedy.  There is a general consensus among the international community that cartel 
activity results in economic harm and it has been suggested that criminal sanctions 
would provide a sufficient remedy for cartel activity.
175
 This has been indicated by 
the introduction of the cartel offence in various competition frameworks, although 
the process has been slow.
176
  Canada (the first jurisdiction to implement competition 
legislation) criminalised cartel activity in 1889, the United Kingdom criminalised 
cartel activity in 2002 and Australia criminalised cartel activity in 2009. Criminal 
sanctions have however only routinely been implemented in the United States, 
perhaps indicative of the unsuitability of the cartel offence in all jurisdictions.
177
  
There are essentially three main challenges which I have identified that need to 
be assessed prior to introducing the cartel offence:  
(i) The moral nexus of the crime; 
(ii) The adequate application of the so-called “traditional” theories of 
punishment; and 
(iii) Ensuring the normative framework is efficient.  
The discussion that follows will attempt to address these challenges and 
ultimately determine whether the cartel offence has a place in competition law. 
Chapter 5 will provide a comparative assessment of the competition framework in 
the United States and the United Kingdom and indicate whether South Africa does in 




                                                          
175




 Terry Calvani, Torello Calvani ‘Cartel sanctions and deterrence’ (2011) 56 The Anti-trust Bulletin 
185 at 188. 
35 
 
4.2.1 Origins of the cartel offence 
The origins of the cartel offence can be found in Canada, which promulgated the 
cartel offence in 1889.
178
 However, the United States has been the most robust in 
enforcing the cartel offence since the inception of the Sherman Act
179
 in 1890. The 
Sherman Act made cartel activity a criminal offence punishable by a maximum of 
one year imprisonment.
180
 However, only two cases in 1921 and 1959 had prison 
sentences imposed.
181
 It was argued in United States v Alton Board Co
182
 that cartel 
activities had not been subject to frequent imprisonment because they were not 
regarded as crimes which were morally reprehensible and therefore did not warrant 
imprisonment.
183
  Consequentially, the 48 individuals who were found guilty of 
collusive tendering were sentenced to a total of 75 days imprisonment.
184
  
In 1987, revised guidelines on federal criminal sentencing were introduced 
and provided for increased sanctions for cartel activity.
185
  The result was a dramatic 
increase in the average sentence of cartelists to 247 days and fines of over $100 
million.
186
 In 2004, maximum criminal sanctions for cartelists were increased from a 
maximum of 3 years to 10 years.
187
 Competition authorities in the United States 
recognised that the criminalisation of cartelists has been a highly effective tool in 
competition enforcement and most importantly in deterring cartel 
activity.
188
Although there are various arguments for and against the cartel offence, 
the point of departure for this discussion, is whether various jurisdictions regard 
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4.2.2 The Moral dilemma 
The cartel offence, as a criminal sanction needs to be justified and rationalised in 
order to be implemented. A survey among British Citizens revealed that only one in 
ten citizens thought that imprisonment was an appropriate sanction for individuals 
who were found guilty of cartel activity.
189
 In Australia, the public opinion was 
divided over whether imprisonment constituted an appropriate sanction for cartel 
activity or not.
190
  General public perception is more inclined to the prevention 
crimes with a visible and direct impact than non-violent acquisitive crimes, like 
cartel activity. The consequence is that it becomes more difficult for the public to 
recognise the severity of cartel activity and most importantly to appreciate the 
“blameworthiness” the activity should attract. The indirect nature of the activity 
creates a somewhat “victimless” situation.  
In the South African context concepts such as the “Zinn triad”
191
 applied in 
sentencing processes which require a proportionality test to be applied between the 
crime, the offender and the interests of society, form a significant consideration in 
determining the moral turpitude of a criminal sanction. The tripartite framework is 
not a definitive consideration for the imposition of criminal sanctions but can form 
the basis for an assessment of a new criminal framework in South Africa.
192
 
Therefore, without the traditional response to cartel activity of moral condemnation 
should cartel activity be subject to criminal sanctions?  
Some would argue that cartel activity can be equated to other crimes because 
cartelists illustrate the same furtive conduct.  The only distinction is that one is not 
fully cognisant of this conduct when it occurs. This does not mean that the harm is 
entirely unnoticeable, nor does it fall outside the bounds of criminal behaviour. 
Cartel activity results in a real social harm and this is evident in inflated prices for 
goods on the market outside the legal bounds of a free market economy.
193
 The 
increased profits are achieved by creating contrived market conditions through acts 
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such as price fixing and not by natural competitive processes.
194
 The association of 
cartel activity as a property crime thus seems justifiable. 
4.3 Traditional criminal theories of punishment 
4.3.1 Retributive theory 
The purpose of retributive punishment is to avenge the conduct of the perpetrator 
through a proportionality assessment; the ‘punishment should be of equal value to 
the seriousness of the offence in order for the offender to receive its “just desert.”’
195
 
The effect of the punishment is essentially to “rescind” the crime and therefore 
return the effectiveness of the law and the rights it protected.
196
 It does not seek to 
prevent potential offenders or offenders from committing crimes but to merely 
punish them for their conduct.  
Competition regulation is a form of economic regulation.
197
 Therefore, 
offences brought about by economic regulation do not rely on moral turpitude in 
comparison to more traditional crimes.
198
 The application of the retributive theory 
would be vested on the typography of the cartel offence and its ability to reflect 
social disdain for cartel activity.
199
 In South Africa, the application of this theory 
would be ill-advised due the divergent theoretical basis for criminal sanctions.
200
 
Regulatory laws in South Africa are based on the theory of deterrence.
201
 
Consequentially the objectives of the retributive theory would not be suitable in 
recognising the objectives of competition law in general. 
 
4.3.2 Deterrence theory 
4.3.2.1 Traditional perspective 
The deterrence theory, which has its foundations in utilitarianism, has found 
universal application.
 202
 The theory forms a central component of criminal 
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punishment within South Africa.
203
 The fundamental premise underlying the 
deterrence theory is that: 
‘suffering is a pain that should be avoided and that, as a result, punishment, itself a form of 




The punishment/sentence is thus not directed at the crime itself, but at 
reducing the frequency within which crimes occur.
205
 The cartel offence is 
predicated on creating a special deterrence by implementing non-indemnifiable 
sanctions on directors.
206
 Therefore, the objectives of the deterrence theory would 
provide a theoretical framework within which the cartel offence can operate. As a 
result, the deterrence theory would find better application in competition law than 
the retributive theory. 
4.3.2.2 An Economic perspective 
The economic theory of deterrence provides that individuals are assumed to make 
rational decisions to benefit their own interests, a common occurrence for 
cartelists.
207
 From an economic point of view, one must ensure that the cost the 
cartelist will bear is greater than the benefit, thereby creating a disincentive for cartel 
conduct.
208
 From an efficiency point of view, the theory provides that if the conduct 
is efficient and beneficial to the attainment of social and consumer welfare in South 
Africa, then the conduct should be promoted.
209
 Therefore, the ‘benefit of 
punishment [must be] equal to its marginal cost.’
210
 This translates to not only 
ensuring that the criminal sanctions imposed result in the promotion of consumer 
welfare but, that the practical cost for enforcing these sanctions is equally beneficial 
and financially viable for the enforcing institutions.  
Imprisonment although bearing a cost to society, has a greater deterrent 
effect. Imprisonment is a drastic situation that strips an individual of their freedom of 
movement. Most importantly, the social stigma associated with imprisonment is one 
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that cannot be equated with a monetary penalty.
211
 Therefore, the possibility that 
cartel conduct may result in imprisonment creates a greater deterrent than a monetary 
penalty. It is for this reason that countries like the United States have advocated for 
other jurisdictions to introduce the cartel offence. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The traditional and economic theories of deterrence provide a clear framework 
within which the cartel offence can operate. As mentioned above South Africa’s 
regulatory laws are rooted in the utilitarian concept of deterrence.  The theories 
closely align with the objectives of a competition law framework, namely achieving 
and maintaining economic efficiency. This is achieved by ensuring that the 
typography of the cartel offence deters cartel activity by ensuring that “the cost of 
non-compliance is imposed on one individual, or company, in order to benefit 
society as a whole.”
212
 However, s73A fails to create such a framework as will be 
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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CARTEL OFFENCE IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Based on the preliminary literature provided in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, it is 
contended that the cartel offence is properly criminal. The comparative analysis that 
follows will address the last aspect (ensuring the efficiency of the normative 
framework) as identified in Chapter 4. The discussion will endeavour to illustrate 
that the cartel offence can provide an effective deterrence to cartel conduct and that it 
has been prematurely introduced within the South African competition framework.  
 
5.1 The Cartel Offence in the United Kingdom 
The cartel offence was introduced in the United Kingdom under s190 of the 
Enterprise Act.
213
 It was introduced as a measure to fill the lacunae created by the 
10% administrative penalty cap.
214
 The Treasury/Department of Trade and Industry 
compiled a white paper on the cartel offence.
215
 The white paper revealed that there 
was a possibility that the cap would result in administrative penalties which were not 
proportional to the harm caused by cartelists.
216
 As discussed in Chapter 3, if the 
penalties imposed were proportional to the cartel activity, it would result in dire 
financial consequences for the implicated firm. The white paper was further 
reviewed in a subsequent report which culminated in the cartel offence being 
introduced in 2003.
217
 Thus, the cartel offence is regarded in the United Kingdom as 
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5.1.1 Legislation: The Enterprise Act 
Part 6 of the Enterprise Act introduced the cartel offence. Under Part 6 of the 
Enterprise Act an individual who dishonestly agrees with one or more other persons 
to: 








(iii) To allocate markets/divide customers to engage in bid-rigging;220 is guilty of 
the cartel offence. 
An individual found guilty of said conduct will be criminally liable to imprisonment 
of up to five years, an unlimited fine or both.
221
 Much like s 73A of South Africa’s 
Competition Act, the United Kingdom’s cartel offence also recognises per se 
prohibitions but diverges from s73A in several ways which can be regarded as 
instrumental features for cartel enforcement in the United Kingdom. These features 
will be highlighted below. 
 
5.1.2 Authoritative body : Office of Fair Trade  
The OFT is the equivalent of the Competition Commission in South Africa. It is the 
body in charge of enforcing the Enterprise Act. Section 192 of the Enterprise Act 
empowers the OFT to conduct investigations related to the cartel offence. The OFT 
works in conjunction with the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) an organisation 
entrusted with handling fraud cases.
222
 The Enterprise Act provides clear and 
succinct regulations governing how investigations may be conducted. The OFT may 
launch an investigation if ‘there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an 
offence under section 188 has been committed.’
223
 If it is shown that a criminal 
investigation is likely to ensue, the OFT may forward the case to the SFO or 
continue their investigation in co-operation with the SFO.
224
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The Memorandum of Understanding ‘which records the basis on which they 
will cooperate to investigate and/or prosecute individuals in respect of the cartel 
offence’ is signed between the SFO and the OFT.
225
 It enables both institutions to 
maintain continuous dialogue and to contribute to maximum efficiency. Once a 
reasonable ground has been identified to pursue the matter, the OFT may compel 
person(s) being investigated to provide documents that attest to the offence.
226
 They 
are able to obtain search warrants on permission of the courts, to search the premises 
of the person(s) being investigated.
227
 In addition, the OFT has the extraordinary 





5.1.3 No-Action letters and competition disqualification orders 
The drafters of the Enterprise Act empowered the OFT to issue what are referred to 
as no-action letters.
229
 The notice exempts a cartelist from criminal prosecution 
under the cartel offence for partaking in cartel activity.
230
The individual who applies 
for the no-action letter is required to, among other things, to admit to participation in 
the criminal offence, cooperate with the OFT by providing all information regarding 
cartel activities, and to refrain from engaging in any activities pursuant to the cartel 
nor to take any steps that may act against the OFT’s investigation.
231
A no-action 
letter is issued if it has been illustrated that the cartelist will face prosecution and that 
they meet the requirements.
232
 The OFT notice also clearly sets out the conditions 
under which the no-action letter can be revoked.  
In addition to the no-action letters, the OFT has an interesting feature known 
as Competition Disqualification Orders (“CDO”)
233
 which if granted by the OFT, 
prevents or disqualifies a director of a company which commits a breach of 
competition law.
234
 The no-action letter also prevents a CDO being granted against 
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 In order for the executive to have the court order granted against them, 
they must have been part of a firm that commits a breach of competition law
236
 and 
secondly, that the conduct, according to the courts, makes the director unfit to 
manage the company.
237
 The CDO’s are similar to s69 of the Companies Act
238
 




The availability of no-action letters for cartelists is indicative of the 
importance of the leniency policy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the leniency policy is 
undermined by a framework which fails to protect the incentive the policy creates. 
No-action letters extend immunity to criminal prosecution
240
 and therefore highlight 
that the framework within which the cartel offence operates is more complimentary, 
than in South Africa. 
 
5.1.4 The Burden proof 
The United Kingdom’s cartel offence calls for a slightly different burden of proof. In 
South Africa, if an individual/firm is found guilty of per se prohibited conduct, they 
are automatically found to have committed that conduct and are criminally liable 
according to s73A. The formulation of the cartel offence in the Enterprise Act 
provides a different approach for a finding of guilt. Section 188 provides that an 
individual is guilty of the criminal offence if they ‘dishonestly [agree] with one or 
more other persons to implement, or to cause to be made or implemented any 
prohibited activities provided in s188 (2).’ The provision creates a standard of 
dishonesty which was set out in R v Ghosh
241
and applied in criminal cases in the 
United Kingdom.  
The judgment set out a two-stage test which must be applied to prove 
dishonesty. The first leg of the test, based on an objective inquiry, asks whether 
‘…according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was 
done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by that standard, that is the end of the 
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 If the defendant was dishonest according to those standards, the jury must 
turn to the second leg of the inquiry. The second leg of the test, based on a subjective 
inquiry, asks ‘whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was 
doing was by those standards dishonest.’
243
  
The burden of proof leaves room for a defendant to argue that they acted 
“honestly” a window which is not available in s73A. The defence creates an 
evidentiary burden for the prosecution which as discussed, is removed through per se 
prohibitions.
244
  The courts have also acknowledged that the test for “dishonesty” has 
posed some difficulties for prosecutors due to the ambiguity of defining 
“dishonesty”.
245
 Nonetheless, these sorts of challenges form the naturalia of any 
jurisprudence. What is essential is that s188 provides the necessary incentive for 
cartelists to confess to cartel activity, an incentive which is lost in s73A. 
 
5.1.5 Effectiveness 
Legislation is merely a declaration of intention; it has to be monitored, evaluated and 
enforced in order for it to be effective. This forms a crucial consideration in 
determining whether the cartel offence will result in increased public enforcement 
against cartels. As highlighted previously, this refers to creating the desired deterrent 
effect. If it can be illustrated that the sanction would result in such deterrence, then 
the cartel offence will be beneficial to society. 
The OFT’s prosecutions through the cartel offence have proved less fruitful 
than one would have expected. The Marine Hoses cartel is the first and only case the 
OFT has successfully prosecuted under the cartel offence.
246
 The Managing 
Directors, Bryan were all found guilty under the cartel offence in the United 
Kingdom after being arrested in the United States. All three parties were sentenced 
to 2 years, 20 months and 2 ½ years respectively.
247
 In addition the three executives 
were disqualified from their executive positions through CDO’s for a period of 
between 5 and 7 years.
248
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 The highly publicised case regarding Virgin Atlantic Airways fixing prices 
of passenger fuel surcharges in 2006, did not result in a successful criminal 
prosecution. In a review conducted by the OFT Board, it was highlighted that the 
criminal case collapsed due to legal and practical challenges faced by the OFT as the 
prosecuting authority.
249
 The Board highlighted that the most problematic aspects of 
case management, had to do with the delineation of privileged and commercially 
sensitive information given by leniency applicants.
250
As part of its 
recommendations, the Board required the OFT to review its leniency guidelines to 
remedy the irregularities they faced throughout the case.
251
   
As highlighted, the R v Gosh test has created a hurdle for securing 
prosecutions and thus needs to be remedied.  Immunity granted to cartelists by the 
European Commission does not extend to cartelists on a national scale and therefore 
has the potential of affecting the leniency policy.
252
 Lastly due to the lack of a 
settlement process for violating the cartel offence, all cases must go to trial. They 
system may be better served by the availability of a settlement process.
253
 The 
findings of the Board and the challenges discussed illustrates that no legal 
framework is infallible. The Enterprise Act reinforces the powers of the OFT as a 
competition authority in principle The United Kingdom’s regulatory competition 
framework on the whole is indicative of a complimentary framework as highlighted 
above and has the ingredients for a very effective system. Most importantly, the Act 
does not seek to undermine the crucial components of cartel enforcement, a problem 
evident in the formulation of s73A.  
 
5.2 THE ‘CARTEL OFFENCE’ IN THE UNITED STATES 
5.2.1 Legislation: The Sherman Act 
The United States is a routine applier of the cartel offence. The enactment of the 
Sherman Act
254
 in the United States introduced the criminalisation of cartel conduct. 
The Act initially recognised cartel conduct as a misdemeanour offence i.e. a crime 
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which is not very serious, a decision which can be attributed to the categorisation of 
cartel activity as ‘not [being a crime] of moral turpitude.’
255
  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that  
‘every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.’  
 
The provision prohibits any form of concerted practice in restraint of trade or 
commerce.
256
 The penalty for such conduct will result in a criminal conviction or a 
fine. In 2004, the criminal statutory penalty was increased to 10 years, the individual 
fine was increased from $1 million to $10 million and the corporate fine was 
increased from $10 million to $100 million.
257
 These developments are indicative of 
a strong inclination towards criminal enforcement for hard-core cartel activity. 
 
5.2.2 Authoritative body: The United States Department of Justice 
The success of the cartel offence in the United States can be attributed to its 
structural characteristics. There is a division between the institutions which conduct 
civil cartel enforcement and criminal cartel enforcement. The Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) has an Antitrust Division which has sole jurisdiction over federal criminal 
antitrust enforcement.
258
 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) handles civil 
competition enforcement. Criminal enforcement has been localised to “hard-core” 
cartel activity; price-fixing, market allocation and bid-rigging. No defence is 
afforded to cartelists found guilty of per se prohibitions. However, the competition 
enforcement framework creates a window for cartelists to defend per se prohibited 
conduct. If it can be illustrated that price-fixing was indirect and could contribute to 
some form of efficiency, the courts exercise the discretion to determine if the per se 
prohibition rule should be applied rigidly.
259
 It has been argued that this approach 
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The US has been highly successful in prosecuting cartelists. The Antitrust Division 
managed to win 82 criminal cartel cases out of the 58 which were filed in 2012. 45 
individuals were sentenced to a total of 33,603 days of imprisonment.
261
 There has 
been a marked increase in enforcement in comparison to 2003 where only 19 cases 




The effectiveness of the Antitrust Division has been centred on a series of 
developments which have expanded the reach of the division. First, the investigatory 
powers of the division were amended to allow wiretaps to be conducted during 
criminal investigations subject to pre-approval.
263
 The developments are an 
indication that the United States government equates cartel activity with other severe 
economic crimes.
264
 Secondly, the Antitrust Division has removed the no-jail deal, a 
tool used to lure defendants to co-operate or to confess to their cartel activity. The 
no-jail deal, as the term suggests, is an agreement between the Antitrust Division and 
the defendants which guarantees no imprisonment in exchange for their full co-
operation during the investigation.
265
 The Antitrust Division has now decided that 




The decision to withdraw the no-jail option is once again indicative that 
cartel activity is severe enough to warrant imprisonment.  Although the withdrawal 
of the no-jail option could also be viewed as a disincentive for cartelists to make use 
of the amnesty policy (the equivalent to SA’s leniency policy), the successes of the 
Antitrust Division thwart this premise. Lastly, the amnesty policy/leniency policy 
which is globally regarded as the most effective tool for enforcement creates an 
incentive for cartelists to come forward.  
The reinforcing nature of cartel enforcement in the United States thus 
compliments the Division’s efforts. Most importantly, the regulatory framework 
enables civil and criminal prosecutions to run simultaneously. This is also owed to 
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the extensive staff it has within the Antitrust Division and the FTC.
267
 In addition, 
the antitrust authorities are able to focus their efforts on hard-core cartel activity.
268
 
The localisation of resources has resulted in two key consequences: it enables 
companies to easily comply with competition regulations by being able to delineate 
which conduct is prohibited and it aids in the preservation of resources.
269
 The 
United States also has made use of its settlement process which has been a major 
contributing factor in successful prosecutions.
270
 
The only similarities that exist with the South African competition 
framework is the leniency policy which maintains the same carrot and stick 
approach. The only exception is that immunity is offered from both civil and 
criminal prosecutions in the United States. What South African competition 
authorities can draw from the regulatory framework in the United States is the 
fortification of the Antitrust Division through policy. Secondly, criminal 
prosecutions remain within the jurisdiction of the competition authorities. The 
overall framework places emphasis on ensuring the efficacy of the leniency policy as 
a significant tool in cartel enforcement. 
 
5.3 THE CARTEL OFFENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The cartel offence in South Africa seeks to bring together two differing institutions: 
the Commission which is strictly an economic enforcement institution as per the 
Competition Act and the NPA which is a criminal enforcement institution guided by 
its own policy directives. Section 73A has created a relationship between the 
Commission and the NPA. Section 73A has created an overlap between the powers 
and duties of NPA and the Commission.  In addition, it has raised some 
constitutional concerns and called into question the suitability of the cartel offence 
within the competition framework in South Africa. These complexities will be 
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5.3.1 Section 73A Provisions and Complexities 
5.3.1.1 The Burden of Proof that needs to be met in s73A 
Section 73A introduces a specific threshold that needs to be met by the NPA in order 
to get a conviction. The NPA needs to prove the following elements: 
(i) A person while being a director of a firm or while engaged in a position 
of management authority within that firm: 
(ii) ‘caused the firm to engage in a prohibited practice in terms of s 4(1)(b); 
or 
(iii) knowingly acquiesced271 in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice in 
terms of section 4(1)(b). 
 
The provision requires the NPA to establish criminal liability as a result of the 
director/management authority failing to meet their fiduciary duties.
272
 Therefore, 
the NPA must establish a negative duty.
273
 The first element requires the NPA to 
establish that either a director or an individual in management authority, engaged in 
prohibited conduct. Identifying an individual who is in management authority may 
create some uncertainties.
274
 The substantive evidence illustrating that an individual 
is in management authority is similar to that of a director and thus creating that 
distinction may prove difficult.
275
 
The second element, requires the NPA to prove the element of causation by 
illustrating that the individual was the causal factor in the violation of s4(1)(b).
276
 It 
can be assumed that the parameters of the element of causation found within 
criminal law will apply.
277
 Causation is not clearly defined and as a result creates 
uncertainty as to what evidentiary burden the NPA would have to overcome. Would 
evidence of the director/management authorities’ participation in meetings constitute 
causation or would more tangible evidence be required to establish causation?
278
 
Would evidence of indirect causation of the anti-competitive conduct implicate an 
individual? These are a few questions the courts will have to grapple with. 
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The third element requires the NPA to establish that the director/management 
authority had knowingly agreed and had actual knowledge of the firm violating 
s4(1)(b). Once again there is a lack of clarity as to the evidentiary burden the NPA 
would have to overcome. An interpretation of the provision suggests that a 
director/management authorities’ must have formally agreed and had full knowledge 
of the prohibited conduct.
279
 The formulation of s73A seems to be too narrow and 
creates a high evidentiary burden to be met by the NPA. The provision thus creates a 
window for a defence by the director/management authority to dispute their actual 
knowledge and acquiescence of cartel conduct.
280
 Without any tangible evidence, the 
NPA would fail to establish the burden of proof. The formulation of the offence is 
thus radically different from that of the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
5.3.1.2 Dual Proceedings between the Competition Commission  and the 
National Prosecuting Authority 
The Competition Commission is the sole authority responsible for cartel 
enforcement in South Africa. Section 73A seeks to give sole jurisdiction to the NPA 
to criminally prosecute those guilty of violating s73A. The prosecuting authority has 
the power to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry out 
any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings. Section 179
281
 
provides the general framework within which the NPA operates. Section 21(1)(b) of 
the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act
282
 empowers the NPA to issue 
policy directives in accordance with s179 of the Constitution. The policy directives 
are exercised within the bounds of the policy provided in the National Prosecuting 
Authority Amendment Act and are independent from the Commission.
283
  
The implications of s73A(4) is a dual process that has aptly been described as 
“proceedings [which are] bound to end up in tears. And it is tears for those who have 
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to prosecute the cartel and possibly joy for the cartel and those involved in it.”
284
 The 
“tears” are a consequence of the duplicity of the process which creates technical 
complexities. One of the solutions proposed by the Commission was to have trials 
running concurrently; one before the civil courts and the other before the criminal 
courts, to alleviate the possible overlap between civil and criminal proceedings.
285
 
However, this may result in the courts arriving at two differing conclusions.
286
 There 
is no guarantee that a successful civil prosecution will automatically result in a 
criminal conviction. Thus, the dual proceedings introduce a burden on prosecuting 
authorities.  
The NPA is not a very efficient institution and is at the moment overwhelmed 
and under-resourced. The National Prosecuting Authority’s Annual Performance 
Plan of 2013/2014 indicated a decrease in the convictions of complex commercial 
crimes as tabulated below: 
Financial Years Number of Convictions 





The decrease in performance indicates the lack of proficiency in prosecuting 
complex economic crimes. Therefore, a parallel process is bound to contribute to the 
existing inefficiencies within the NPA.   
In the United Kingdom the OFT and the SFO( both statutory bodies) work jointly 
in cartel criminal prosecutions.
287
 The OFT may launch an investigation if ‘there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under section 188 has been 
committed.’
288
 If it is shown that a criminal investigation is likely to ensue, the OFT 
may forward the case to the SFO or continue with their investigation in co-operation 
                                                          
284
 Tsholofelo Letsike ‘The criminalising of cartels – How effective will the new Section 73A of the 
Competition Amendment Act be?’ Presented at Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, 
Mandela Institute & University of Johannesburg Seventh Annual Competition Law, Economics & 
Policy Conference, Johannesburg , 5 September at 12, available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/seventh-annual-conference-on-competition-law-economics-policy/, 
accessed on 29 September 2013. 
285




 Letsike op cit (n284) at 12. 
288





  In the United States, this issue has been alleviated by giving sole 
jurisdiction for federal criminal cartel prosecutions to the DOJ. The FTC has sole 
jurisdiction for federal civil cartel prosecutions as mentioned above. Both institutions 
have ‘coextensive jurisdiction’ even though their policies are not always 
harmonious.
290
 Its success in using dual processes is likely owed to the extensive 




There was a proposition that cartel prosecutions in their entirety should be 
entrusted to the NPA.
292
 However, this approach was applied in the old Competition 
framework and it did not result in any cartel prosecutions and is likely to be a 
fruitless exercise within the current competition framework.
293
 Therefore, in the 
South African context, to achieve what the United States has managed to achieve, 
would require the creation of a highly skilled enforcement agency and policies in 
line with said objectives. 
  
5.3.1.3 Undercutting the leniency policy  
The leniency policy is a highly effective plea-bargaining mechanism that has 
resulted in successful enforcement against cartels.
294
 The Commission in 2011/2012 
financial year received approximately 244 leniency applications in comparison to the 
33 it had received the in 2010/2011 financial year.
295
  In early 2013, the Commission 
made use of its fast-track settlement process that incentivises firms to admit to anti-
competitive activity by offering an expeditious resolution of complaints, minimising 
legal costs and lesser penalties than those they were likely to receive in court 
proceedings.
296
 Twenty-one firms responded to the Commission’s offer of early 
settlement and the Commission uncovered three hundred instances of bid rigging as 
a result thereof.
297
 The Commission managed to settle with 15 construction firms for 
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 The figures are therefore indicative of the effectiveness of the 
leniency policy as an incentive for cartelists to confess to their conduct.  
As mentioned above, the NPA will maintain exclusive jurisdiction in 
determining which individuals are prosecuted. Section 73A (4) only allows the 
Commission to make submissions to the NPA for leniency of deserving 
applicants.
299
The submissions are only of persuasive value and do not guarantee 
immunity from criminal prosecution. This effectively means that that leniency policy 
will not be extended to criminal prosecutions and will only offer immunity from civil 
prosecutions.  
Generally, the cost of being prosecuted for cartel activity does not outweigh the 
benefits derived from cartel activity due to under-deterrent administrative 
penalties.
300
 Consequentially, the leniency policy offers cartelists an opportunity to 
maximise their benefits by reducing the cost of being part of a cartel. The process is 
relatively transparent and cartelists are aware of the existing incentive the leniency 
policy offers. The cartel offence removes the transparency that the leniency policy 
provides by granting the NPA with the discretion to decide who deserves leniency. 
As an applicant it is a gamble to make use of the leniency policy because immunity 
from criminal liability is not guaranteed. 
 The OFT has been able to maintain the efficacy of the leniency policy by 
enabling an individual to obtain immunity from criminal prosecution although 
decisions by the European Commission may impact this. The DOJ exercises 
jurisdiction over all cartel prosecutions and also offers immunity from criminal 
prosecutions. One wonders why the South African authorities do not follow suit if 
they intend on making the cartel offence part of the competition legal framework. 
Perhaps if there was more cohesiveness between competition authorities and other 
anti-corruption agencies the cartel offence would be viable. Until this issue is 
resolved, it is highly unlikely that directors/executives will be willing to make use of 
the leniency policy if it would result in imprisonment.
301
 As a result the leniency 
policy will be become an inefficient incentive scheme. 
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5.3.1.4 Possible constitutional issues 
There have been several constitutional issues that have been raised with regard to 
s73A and they are discussed below. 
(i) The Reverse onus 
 Section 73A(5) enables admissions obtained through consent orders to be used as 
prima facie evidence of activity falling within the scope of s4(1)(b). It has been 
argued that s73(A)(5) creates a reverse onus.
302
 The implications of a reverse onus 
are that an individual’s constitutional right to a fair trial,
303
 which includes the right 
to be presumed innocent,
304
would be infringed. The burden of persuading the courts 
of the accused’s guilt should fall entirely on the state.
305
 However, whether 
s73(A)(5) is unconstitutional, would be dependent on whether it creates a ‘true 
reverse onus [or an] evidentiary burden shift.’
306
The courts have vehemently been 
opposed to the creation of a true reverse onus in statutory provisions especially 
where an individual could face imprisonment.
307
 However, if the reverse onus results 
in an evidentiary burden shift, then it must be determined whether the limitation of 
the accused’s right is constitutionally justifiable.
308
  The two-stage approach 
provides a framework within which one can determine whether the reverse onus is 
unconstitutional and is as follows: 
a. ‘First, does the provision violate the presumption of innocence and the 
requirement that the accused's guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt? 
If it can be illustrated that the provision can result in the accused being 




b. Secondly, is it a justifiable limitation in terms of section 36(1) of the 
Constitution?’
310
 The limitations clause requires the courts to consider 
whether ‘the limitation is reasonable and justifiable within an open and 
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democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking 
into account all relevant factors;’  
From reading the two-stage approach, there are two arguments that can be 
presented for and against s73A(5). First, s73A(5) is unconstitutional because it may 
result in the accused being convicted without any evidence being presented. This is 
because their guilt is presumed through the consent orders. A limitation of that 
nature would be unjustifiable because the existing reverse onus was envisioned only 
for civil prosecutions in the Competition Tribunal and not the criminal courts.
311
 In 
addition, the accused may not have been privy to the proceedings in the Tribunal or 
the Competition Appeal Court and thus not have been given an opportunity to defend 
themselves.
312
 As a result the limitation is clearly unreasonable.  
Secondly, s73A(5) only seeks to prevent a duplication of processes. The 
Commission has already established that s4(1)(b) has been infringed and the NPA is 
required to illustrate that the individual ‘[caused or permitted] a firm to engage in a 
prohibited practice in terms of s4(1)(b);
 313
or knowingly acquiesced in the firm 
engaging in a prohibited practice in terms of s4(1)(b).’
314
 There is no reverse onus on 
the accused because the provision does not shift the evidentiary burden. The term 
“prima facie” requires the accused to provide evidence to the contrary of a presumed 
fact.
315
 It merely eliminates the duplication of processes.  
This is a contentious provision which will undoubtedly be left for the courts to 
decide. Nonetheless, if the constitutional issues were to be resolved, it would not 
address the vulnerable position of the leniency policy, the principal concern raised 
by the Commission. 
 
(ii) Self-Incrimination 
The wording of s73 is creates the possibility that information volunteered by a 
cartelist in their leniency application or consent order, may be used to incriminate 
them in subsequent criminal proceedings. Section 35(3)(j) of the Constitution 
protects individuals against self-incrimination. In light of s35(3)(j), one has to 










 Scagul v AG Western Cape 1996 (11) BCLR 1543 (CC) para 11. 
56 
 
determine whether the NPA would be at liberty to use incriminating evidence 
obtained through competition civil proceedings in criminal proceedings.  
A similar question was posed with regard to s417(2) of the Companies Act.
316
 
The provision in effect compelled individuals to answer incriminating questions 
during an inquiry.  The provision was later declared unconstitutional in Ferreira v 
Levin NO
317
 because it allowed evidence obtained through an inquiry to be used in 
criminal proceedings against the examinee. The decision protected the examinee’s 
from self-incrimination. 
 In a competition context, a cartelist who approaches the Commission and 
volunteers incriminating information may find themselves in the dock at their own 
hand. This context is starkly different from the one formulated in the Companies Act 
because the cartelist is not compelled to provide the information. However, if one 
were to rely strictly on the finding provided in Ferreira v Levin, then it would be 
unconstitutional to allow the evidence proffered by the cartelist to be used in 
criminal proceedings against them regardless of the context in which the information 
was divulged. Therefore, it is probable that s73A (5) would not meet constitutional 
muster on the ground that it results in the self-incrimination.  
 
5.4 Does the cartel offence have a place in South African competition law? 
The question we are thus faced with is whether the cartel offence has a place within 
South African competition law. From a prima facie perspective, one can answer that 
in the affirmative. As illustrated through the analysis of the frameworks in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, it is plausible to have a cartel offence and it can be 
an effective deterrent. However, as indicated above there are some clear difficulties 
in the typography of s73A. The dual administrative process envisioned between the 
Commission and the NPA is unclear and poses the greatest problem. As a result of 
the jurisdictional stronghold the NPA has over the criminal prosecution of cartels, 
the Commission is essentially removed from the process.  
The question of the evidentiary shift has called into question the 
constitutionality of s73A(5) and perhaps could impede the prosecutorial process. 
Most importantly, the expertise of the NPA in handling competition issues is of 
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concern. If the “prima facie evidence rule” is eradicated it would be up to the NPA 
to essentially establish an infringement of s4(1)(b), an exercise which they are not 
adequately skilled to do. The Amendment is clearly problematic and as voiced by the 
Commission severely undermines the efficacy of the leniency policy. Even if the 
potential constitutional issues were to be ameliorated, the Commission’s most 
effective enforcement tool would be eroded. Thus, it calls into question if there 
would be a more efficient mechanism to create a deterrent effect without introducing 
a cartel offence. 
In a recent development, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
(“the Hawks”) intends to hold directors/executives criminally liable for their 
involvement in the construction cartel.
318
 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act
319
 (“Corruption Act”) ,which creates a general offence of corruption 
and criminalises certain corrupt activities, and the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act
320
 (“POCA”), which deals with racketeering activities, can be used to charge 
directors/executives who engage in price-fixing, market allocation and collusive 
tendering (bid-rigging).
321
 Section 73A was tabled to fill the lacunae in the 
Corruption Act and POCA.
322
 Criminal prosecutions may result in directors being 
charged with fraud and corruption, in addition to the criminal charges under the 
Competition Amendment Act.  Consequentially, there is a possibility of criminal 
charges being brought against individuals through the Corruption Act, POCA and 
the Competition Amendment Act. Perhaps the competition framework would be 
better suited if existing legislation such as POCA catered for the cartel offence. It 
would prevent authorities prosecuting individuals in triplicate. The NPA and the 
courts are already overwhelmed and under resourced and this would be a more 
pragmatic approach. 
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There have been various suggestions proffered by the Commission who as 
mentioned above oppose the introduction of a cartel offence in South Africa. There 
has also been a proposal of increasing existing criminal provisions found in Chapter 
7 of the Competition Act.
323
 Section 74(1)(b) holds any person convicted of an 
offence in terms of the Competition Act ‘in any other case, to a fine not exceeding 
R2,000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or to both a fine 
and imprisonment.’
324
 The legislative framework would be better served by 
reinforcing these existing provisions by increasing the disincentive to commit 
Chapter 7 offences.
325
  An increase in administrative penalties to be in proportional 
with the number of years the cartel was active was also suggested due to the under-
deterrent nature of administrative penalties.
326
 However, as explained in previous 
chapters, it would likely result in the liquidation of most firms.  Dawn Raids
327
 have 
been of some benefit in allowing the Commission to secure evidence for prosecution 
but, they remain the only pre-emptive effort the Commission can apply.  
It is my contention that too much focus has been placed on public 
competition enforcement and not enough on the private competition enforcement. 
This issue will be canvassed fully in the next chapter. The reality is that the business 
community and consumers are most affected by cartel activity. The business 
community is well-resourced and has the opportunity of playing an active role in 
shaping the competition framework.
328
 That being said, the cartel offence is 
premature and a new discourse needs to be encouraged regarding remedial 








                                                          
323




 Lewis op cit (n172) at 229. 
326
 Ibid at 230. 
327
 s48 of the Competition Act 
328
 Lewis op cit (n174) at 231. 
59 
 
CHAPTER 6 PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT 
6.1 The benefits of private litigation in competition law 
Follow-on damages litigation is a novel concept within the South African 
competition law arena and therefore no jurisprudence exists. Competition law has 
always been dominated by public competition enforcement while private 
competition enforcement has been inactive.  The general goal of public competition 
enforcement is to maintain and foster a competition compliant culture. This is 
achieved through various means but the main goal is creating a significant deterrent 
effect; its central focus.
329
 Private competition enforcement, although personal in 




6.1.1 Private competition enforcement – a deterrent 
Private competition enforcement provides a deterrent in two ways: first, it 
incentivises consumers and competitors to pursue private competition enforcement 
due to the personal rewards they stand to gain.
331
 In jurisdictions such as the United 
States where punitive and treble damages are available, consumers and competitors 
have even more to gain from a successful private action. Secondly, firms risk paying 
significantly high damages to consumers or competitors or both.
332
  This will alter 
the cost/benefit analysis conducted by cartels and increase the cost of partaking in 
cartel activity exponentially. Unlike administrative penalties where there is a 10% 
cap, when damages are awarded they are quantified in accordance to the harm or loss 
suffered. With the advent of class actions in South African competition law, 
cartelists now risk having to pay damages to a class of litigants which could mean 
millions of rands. The potential disincentive that individual litigation could present is 
thus remedied by collective action. 
In other jurisdictions such as the United States, follow-on damages litigation 
has played a pivotal role in not only empowering consumers and competitors but 
also in competition enforcement.
333
 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that “any 
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
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forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue ... and shall recover three-fold the damages 
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.” A 
recent study on the deterrent effect of private competition enforcement illustrated 
that private enforcement was a significant and positive asset in assisting the DOJ in 
cartel enforcement.
334
 The study which entailed an assessment of private 
enforcement cases conducted by the DOJ from 1990 to 2007 revealed that private 
cartel enforcement has a superseding deterrent effect than the DOJ’s own antitrust 
enforcement program.
335
 The study was prompted by comments such as those made 
by the FTC’s Commissioner J Thomas Rosch who stated that “treble damage class 
action cases are almost as scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are generally at 




The study assessed forty private litigation cases which provided three times 
the deterrence that criminal antitrust cases provided.
337
 The forty cases resulted in a 
recovery of up to $196billion.
338
 Twenty-five out of the forty cases were decided 
through actual litigation based on the finding that firms were guilty of per se 
prohibited conduct.
339
 This is in comparison to the $6.75billion recovered from the 
DOJ’s criminal cases during the same time period.
340
 The figures arrived at above 
exclude additional factors (the value of products, discounts, services and coupons) 
which ‘formed part of the relief and which would have increased the deterrent value 
of private antitrust litigation.’
341
 The results from the study revealed that 16 out of 40 




Private enforcement has the advantage of empowering consumers and 
competitors to be able to claim damages for the harm and loss suffered at the hand of 
anti-competitive behaviour. Therefore, follow-on damages litigation is a mechanism 
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that can be utilised by consumers to protect their right to choose the best product at 
the most competitive price.  
In 2005, Nationwide Airlines launched the first ever follow-on damages 
litigation case against South African Airways. South African Airways had employed 
an incentive scheme that would reward travel agents for redirecting customers from 
competing domestic airlines (primarily Nationwide Airlines and BA/Comair) to 
South African Airways.
343
 South African Airways was fined R45million for 
engaging in prohibited anti-competitive conduct.
344
 The action would have been the 
first of its kind for follow-on damages litigation and set an important precedent for 
civil claims within competition law. However, the parties settled out of court and the 
much awaited judgment was never delivered.  
It was only a decade later when the judgment of Children’s Resources Centre 
v Pioneer Food 
345
 made follow-on damages litigation a real possibility for 
consumers and competitors.  Therefore, the discussion that follows will provide a 
synopsis of the salient features of a claim for follow-on damages litigation and 
ultimately prove that private competition enforcement can provide the desired 
deterrent effect than the cartel offence.  
 
6.2 The Legislative framework for follow-on damages litigation 
6.2.1 Section 65 certificate 
Section 65 of the Competition Act enables a claimant seeking damages or who has 
suffered loss as a result of anticompetitive conduct to commence civil action against 
a firm. Section 65(6)(b) specifically requires the claimant to ‘file with the Registrar 
of Clerk of the Court a notice from the Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, or 
the Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court.’ The notice certifies that the 
anticompetitive conduct is prohibited. The notice is conclusive proof of the 
prohibited conduct and is therefore binding on the civil courts.
346
 Therefore, it is 
beyond the scope of the civil courts to re-assess that a firm was found guilty of 
prohibited conduct. Once the s 65 certificate has been issued, the claimant may 
pursue follow-on damages litigation in a civil court.  
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The Competition Tribunal has sole jurisdiction to issue a s65 certificate. The 
scope of application of the certificate was questioned in Premier Foods (Pty) Ltd v 
Manoim N.O
347
Following an application to determine the Competition Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to issue a section 65 certificate, the North Gauteng High Court in 
Premier Foods (Pty) Ltd v Manoim NO
348
 dismissed the claim that section 65 could 
not be applied to a firm who was not a formal party before the Tribunal. Premier 
Foods was granted leniency in terms of the leniency policy after confessing to its 
involvement in a bread cartel in the Western Cape.
349
 The application for 
certification was brought by the respondents who are seeking to institute civil action 
for damages, against the applicant, for its conduct (price-fixing among other things) 
as a member of the bread cartel.
350
 The applicant argued that the Competition 
Tribunal was prevented from making any order against it because it was never a 
formal party before the Tribunal.
351
   
The Court held that the language of s58 (1)(a)(v)
352
 was  not limited to a 
party formally cited before it. The s65 certification only acts as ‘an affirmation or an 
attestation of a finding already made [and] such a finding is of the kind contemplated 
in s58(1)(a)(v).’
353
 Unlike the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform 
Act
354
 in the United States,
355
 leniency applicants in South Africa are not afforded 
protection from follow-on damages. Therefore, the judgment will enable 
consumers/competitors to pursue follow-on damages litigation against a firm which 
has been granted leniency. The overarching effect of the judgment is to deny any 
firms which were found guilty of prohibited anti-competitive conduct and granted 
leniency, an avenue to escape liability for any harm or loss they may have caused.  
The judgment although praised by the applicants, raised a valuable critique 
regarding the leniency policy. As discussed before, one of the justifications provided 
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by the Commission for opposing the introduction of a cartel offence was the negative 
impact it would have on the leniency policy. The same could be said for follow-on 
damages. Cartelists may be forced to plunge back into secrecy due to the risk of 
having to bear the cost of paying maximum damages to claimants, as opposed to the 
10% cap placed on administrative penalties. However, one could argue that leniency 
policy could remain effective, as argued in Chapter 4, if accesses to documents in 
leniency applications are kept strictly confidential. In some instances the information 
disclosed by a cartelist may contribute to subsequent claims against it. Therefore, it 
is essential that follow-on damages litigation policy is drafted with the leniency 
policy in mind. It must be remembered that unlike the United States, the South 
African courts only award single damages. Therefore, even if a court awards 
maximum damages to litigants one cannot deny them what is rightfully owed to 
them due to anticompetitive conduct. The exercise thus calls for a delicate balance to 
be struck between the leniency policy and what is owed to consumers/competitors.  
6.2.2. Nature of a claim for follow-on damages 
As mentioned above follow-on damages litigation is a novel experience for South 
African competition law.  Consequentially, it was in Children’s Resources Centre v 
Pioneer Food
356
 that the nature of a civil claim for follow-on damages was 
established.  The consumers argued that their claim for damages was a delictual 
claim which derived from a breach of a statutory duty.
357
 Before delving into the 
approach taken by the courts, a brief background on the Children’s Resources Centre 
judgment will be provided. 
In 2006, Premier Foods, Tiger Consumer Brands (“Tiger Brands”), Pioneer 
Food and Foodcorp (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the bread cartel”) were 
the subject of complaints received by the Competition Commission for price-
fixing.
358
 The bread cartel had coordinated and fixed the price of bread produced and 
distributed to consumers within the Western Cape and on a national scale. The 
Commission’s investigation revealed that the bread cartel had formally agreed to 
increase the bread price lists and placed restrictions on the discounts granted to 
distributors within the Western Cape.
359
 Retailers/ wholesalers (large national 
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supermarket chains, smaller general retailers and informal sellers) purchased bread at 
a fixed price and then made the bread available to consumers to purchase at a retail 
level.
360
 The prices the retailers purchased the bread from the bread cartel, was 
determined by the fixed discounts which derived from price lists which were 
negotiated at a national or regional level depending on the retailer.
361
  At the same 
time, discounts offered to distributors in the Western Cape were also fixed.
362
 The 
result was indirect price-fixing.  
On a National scale, the bread cartel was also found to have contravened 
s4(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Competition Act.
363
 As will be discussed at a later stage, 
this may impact the quantum of harm the consumers experience and ultimately the 
quantum of damages the consumers and distributors may receive.  
The Commission’s investigation in the Western Cape prompted Premier 
Food to disclose their involvement in the bread cartel and was consequentially 
granted leniency.
364
 The information provided by Premier Food resulted in the 
Commission conducting an investigation on a National scale.
365
 Tiger Brands and 
Foodcorp settled with the Commission and paid an administrative penalty of R99 
million and R45 million.
366
 Pioneer Foods was found guilty of prohibited 
anticompetitive conduct by the Competition Tribunal and was fined R196 million.
367
  
In 2010, subsequent to the administrative penalties being imposed on the 
cartelists, a class of consumers and a class of distributors approached the Western 
Cape High Court to certify a class action. The consumers alleged that the 
respondents were in breach of a statutory duty.
368
 The statutory duty was born from 
the Competition Act which prohibits anticompetitive conduct of which the 
respondents were found guilty of.
369
 The distributors alleged that they had suffered 
financial loss due to the fixed discounts they received when they purchased the bread 
from the bread cartel and sought to claim damages.
370
 Both applications for 
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certification by the consumers and the distributors were dismissed by the High Court 
and went on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal once again dismissed the distributor’s case but 
upheld the application made by the consumers.  The consumers’ application was 
remitted back to the High Court in order for the consumers to supplement their 
papers to pursue their claim for damages.
371
 The distributors appealed their matter to 
the Constitutional Court who upheld their application for certification of an opt-in 
class action.
372
 The matter was remitted back to the High Court for the distributors to 
supplement their affidavits to pursue their claim for damages.
373
  
6.2.1.1 Children’s Resource Centre – Section 65 interpretation 
Section 65(6) creates a remedy by allowing ‘a person who has suffered loss or 
damage as a result of a prohibited practice’ to recover their loss. Consequentially, the 
consumers argued that a statutory legal duty exists, not to cause financial loss.
374
As 
mentioned above, the consumers alleged that as a result of the prohibited anti-
competitive conduct by the bread cartel they suffered harm and financial loss. They 
submitted that ‘a breach of a statutory duty can give rise to a legal duty not to cause 
financial loss.’
375
 Therefore, because s65(6) creates a legal duty not to cause loss or 
damage, the consumers can make a delictual claim for loss.  A delict is defined as 
‘an act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another.’
376
 
The law of delict seeks to govern the private law arena by creating legal remedies for 
patrimonial losses that occur between private individuals.  It is inherent that a legal 
duty exists prior to one being able to make a claim for any loss suffered. To find 




i. An act; 
ii. Wrongfulness; 
iii. Fault; 
iv. Causation; and 
v. Harm. 
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Premier Food proffered a different interpretation of the formulation of s65. 
They submitted that s65 creates a claim for follow-on damages based on a finding 
that a firm engaged in prohibited anti-competitive conduct. Therefore, the claim 
submitted by the consumers was bad in law because any action taken in terms of s65 
would exclude a delictual action.
378
 The interpretation submitted by Premier Foods 
would thus nullify any legal duty on the part of the firm that has been found guilty of 
prohibited anti-competitive conduct.  
The court however, was not convinced by the alternative interpretation provided 
by Premier Foods but did not affirm which interpretation was more acceptable.
379
  
Wallis JA contended that s65 does not necessarily state that one would not have an 
action nor does it state what requirements would have to be met.
380
  In addition, for 
one to make a claim based on the existence of a legal duty, without illustrating that 
there was a legal duty would undermine ‘the basic principles by which our law 




On the other hand, the reading of s65(6) may not require the courts to  determine 
whether there was a delict. What the provision calls for is a mechanical process 
which only requires that the quantum of damages be assessed.
382
 Due to the 
incomplete record and the novelty of the issues the court never provided a definitive 
position.
383
 The matter was remitted back to the High Court.
384
 The two 
interpretations provided by the consumers and Premier Food raised some complex 
issues which will affect the future of how a claim for follow-on damages litigation 
would be phrased. It will be left to the High Court to provide much needed clarity. 
6.3 Class actions in competition law 
6.3.1 Background 
‘A class action is a legal procedure which enables the claims (or parts of the claims) 
of a number of persons against the same defendant to be determined in the one 
suit.’
385
 Class actions provide a useful tool for consumer protection and have evolved 
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the role that civil litigation has played within South Africa.
386
 Prior to the application 
of class actions, civil litigation could not cater for the civil wrongs committed by 
conglomerates against consumers. ‘The collective interests [could] only be protected 
adequately by collective remedies.’
387
 Class actions (as mentioned) are not a novelty 
within South African law. The report published by the South African Law 
Commission in August 1998 which dealt specifically with the introduction of 
legislation recognising both class actions and public interest actions was meant to 
pave the way for a draft bill.
 388
 However, the Bill never came to fruition. Therefore, 
it has been left to the courts to develop the common law in order to protect and 
enforce class actions. 
Previously, class actions were only recognised in constitutional matters. It 
was in Children’s Resources Centre that class actions in non-constitutional matters 
were realised. Wallis JA noted that the to limit the use of class actions to rights 
infringed under the Bill of Rights and not any other would be irrational.
389
 As a 
result, in Children’s Resource Centre opt-out notice class actions for follow-on 
damages litigation were recognised. 
 An opt-out class action requires notice to be given to the members of the 
class, for them to determine whether they want to be excluded from the class action. 
Opt-out class actions are more inclusive because those who out of ignorance fail to 
notify the members will still be eligible to receive the remedy.
390
 Consequentially, 
opt-out class actions are generally preferred. The importance of providing notice is 
rooted in the binding nature of a judgment given for an opt-out class action. Whether 
the judgment is favourable or unfavourable will impact the nature of the class. 
Therefore, strict notification requirements need to be met to identify persons who do 
not wish to be part of the class and those who may wish to litigate in their own 
personal capacity.
391
 The principle of res judicata would undoubtedly pose 
tremendous difficulty for the individuals who may have sought to litigate in their 
own personal capacity.  
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The judgment which has developed what is a constitutionally recognised 
right
392
, set important precedent for non-constitutional class actions. The judgment, a 
first for South African class action jurisprudence, laid down the procedural 
requirements for the certification of a prospective class action. Therefore, Children’s 
Resource Centre opened the doorway for class actions to serve their purpose in the 
South African Economy where many are poor, uneducated and lack the means to 
individually institute claims against the ‘goliaths’ of commercial industries.  
6.3.2 Class action certification process 
It is a pre-requisite for a class action to be certified prior to the formation of a class 
action and prior to a summons being issued.
393
 The prime justification, among 
others, is to prevent nuisance suits or dilatory tactics. In jurisdictions such as the 
United States, a representative may commence a class action on behalf of a specific 
class.
394
 They make use of the ideological plaintiff; one who may act as a 
representative of a class but not necessarily be a member of the class.
395
 In 
Children’s Resource Centre Wallis JA laid out the five requirements to be met in 
order for a class to be certified. The requirements derive from the report published 
by the South African Law Commission. The requirements are as follows: 
i. ‘The definition of the class; 
ii. The identification of some common claim or issue that can be determined by 
way of a class action; 
iii. Some evidence of the existence of a valid cause of action; 
iv. The court being satisfied that the representative is suitable to represent the 
members of the class; and 
v. The court being satisfied that a class action is the most appropriate procedure 




In Mukaddam v Pioneer Food
397
 the applicants sought the certification of an opt-
in class action, which requires individuals who intend on becoming members of the 
class action to make their intentions expressly known.
398
 The applicant Mr Imraahn 
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Ismail Mukaddam distributed bread purchased from the Pioneer Food.
399
 His 
business was centred on selling bread to informal traders who subsequently sold the 
bread at a retail level, to consumers.
400
 The bread distributors launched an 
application in the High Court requesting certification of a class action against the 
bread cartel.
401
 Their claim was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that there 
was no cause of action justifying the class action. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal dismissed their claim on the ground that opt-in class actions were an 
exceptional procedural mechanism which was not suitable for their claim. The court 
held Rule 10 of the Uniform Rules of Court (which allows multiple claimants to join 
in a single action), was the more appropriate procedural mechanism.
402
  
The distributors launched their final appeal at the Constitutional Court against 
the decisions in both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. The 
Constitutional Court rejected the reasoning provided by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.
403
 It granted the certification of an opt-in class action for the distributors.
404
 
The Constitutional Court based its decision on ensuring access to justice and most 
importantly creating accepted standards of procedure for certifying a class action.
405
 
Nugent J stated in Children’s Resource Centre that the claim presented by the 
consumers was potentially plausible.
406
 Jafta J in Mukkadam questioned why the 
same approach was not applied to the claim by the bread distributors particularly 
because the facts presented by the bread distributors and the consumers were related 
to the same complaint and both judgments in the Supreme Court of Appeal were 
delivered on the same day.
407
 Jafta J noted that rigidity in the application of the law 
is inconsistent with the interests of justice.
408
 The Constitutional Court upheld the 
appeal and the matter was remitted back to the High Court.
409
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In other jurisdictions such as the United States and Canada the opt-in notice is 
unavailable.
410
 The Ontario Commission failed to recognise opt-in notice class 
actions because they are like ‘[a] permissive joinder device’.
411
 The South African 
Law Commission favoured the inclusion of the opt-in procedure but did not discuss 
any potential overlap with Rule 10.
412
  Nugent JA asserted that opt-in notice class 
actions should only be applied in exceptional circumstances.
413
 The assertion was 
based on the availability of the joinder device as an alternative procedural 
mechanism as found in Rule 10.
414
   A joinder is defined as: 
[A]ny number of persons, each of whom has a claim, whether jointly, jointly and severally, 
separately or in the alternative, may join as plaintiffs in one action against the same defendant or 
defendants against whom any one or more of such persons proposing to join as plaintiffs would, 
if he brought a separate action, be entitled to bring such action, provided that the right to relief of 
the persons  proposing to join as plaintiffs depends upon the determination of substantially the 
same question of law or fact which, if separate actions were instituted, would arise on each 




There is a clear similarity between both procedural mechanisms. It seems that 
when the Constitutional Court approached this question they did not address how the 
courts would delineate between the use of Rule 10 and an opt-in class action. The 
“exceptional circumstances” reasoning was found to be inconsistent with the 
approach taken by the very same court and panel that provided the judgment for the 
Children’s Resource Centre. As Nugent JA clearly noted ‘claims that have sufficient 
commonality to qualify for a class action will necessarily qualify for a joint action 
under the rule and the converse applies.’
416
  Although the delineation between Rule 
10 and opt-in class actions is beyond the scope of this paper, it is evident that further 
development in this particular area of the law will be necessary for class actions to 
create more certainty.  Perhaps the uncertainty created by the interpretation by 
Nugent JA, will be the catalyst for the statutory promulgation of class actions.   
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The judgments of Mukaddam and Children’s Resource Centre have paved the 
way for class actions in South Africa. As discussed above, the process is not without 
its complexities and challenges. However, what the judgments have created is an 
avenue for private competition enforcement. Cartelists will not only be faced with 
the prospect of administrative penalties but they will also be subject to follow-on 
damages litigation at the behest of consumers/competitors. 
6.5 Quantification of damages 
The main goal when determining the quantum for damages is to ensure that the 
amount rewarded is justifiable and performs the requisite compensatory function. 
The amount awarded to the claimant/class has to be enough to compensate and not to 
unjustly enrich the defendant for their conduct. The South African Law 
Commission’s report proposed that the aggregate assessment would be the correct 
methodology for determining the damages.
417
 The report proposed that if an 
aggregate assessment is made, the court should indicate how the award is to be 
distributed.
418
 There are three generally recognised forms for the quantification of 
damages.  All methods are based on an estimation of damages and are not without 
their challenges. These will be canvassed below. 
6.4.1 Comparative approach 
(i) Before-and-After 
This approach compares the prices during the cartel with the prices before 
and after the cartel.
419
 The method is based on what is commonly referred 
to as the ‘but-for’ test. The assumption is that prices during the time the 
cartel was inactive will provide the best approximation of actual 
product/service prices.
420
 The method has been applied in many 
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This approach draws a comparison between the market where the cartel 
was active and a similar product market, geographic market or a 
combination where the cartel was inactive.
422
 For this method to be as 
accurate as possible, it requires the similar market to have similar ‘cost 




(iii) Multidimensional  
This method of quantification combines the yardstick and before-and-
after approaches. The approach “looks at the development of the relevant 
economic variable in the infringement market during a certain period 
(difference over time on the infringement market) and compares it to the 
development if the same variable during the same time period on an 
unaffected comparator market (difference over time on the non-
infringement market).”
424
 This approach thus seeks to eliminate various 
shortcomings such as price fluctuations owed to external factors, which 





A profit-based approach requires an assessment between the profits 
received during the cartel and absent the cartel.
426
 The excess profit 
received can be calculated ‘by dividing the ‘but for’ profit by the 
production volumes during the cartel period.’
427
 
(ii) Cost plus margin method 
This method calculates the ‘but for’ price through determining the 
‘cost per unit plus a predefined mark-up.’
428
  This quantification 
method would require the plaintiffs to have access to data such as the 
short-run or long-run marginal costs, overhead costs and 
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 It is undoubtedly difficult for the plaintiffs to obtain 




(iii) Critical loss analysis 
This method requires on to ‘[estimate] the price elasticity of the 
cartelised product in question [to] forecast the break-even point where 
the increase in profits obtained via the increase in price would no 
longer outweigh the decrease in profits from lower demand.’
431
 This 




The various quantification methods above represent just a few of the options 
available to litigants to consider. There are some challenges as hinted above such as 
access to quality data, being able to successfully conduct comparative market 
assessments
433
and the value chain which can pose difficulties in identifying the 
market where the anticompetitive conduct had an impact.
434
 No single method is 
perfect but they do represent possibilities that can be pursued by litigants.  
 
6.5 Distribution method 
The final consideration and stage for follow-on damages litigation, after the 
aggregation of damages, is the method of distribution of the damages awarded. The 
South African Law Commission’s report suggested that the ‘the court should give 
directions regarding distribution of the award to class members and may, where 
appropriate, require the defendant to distribute the damages directly to the class 
members.’
435
 In Children’s Resource Centre, the consumers had suggested that the 
award given be placed into a trust to be used to the general benefit of bread 
consumers or it could be used for school feeding schemes.
436
Wallis JA vehemently 
rejected the suggestions and provided that because the consumers had decided to sue 
in delict, they would have to be individually compensated for the loss they 
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 Any other form of distribution would be punitive in nature and thus 
against the fundamental tenants of a claim for damages.
438
 In addition it would 
exclude other members of the class from deciding how the award should be 
distributed.
439
 Wallis JA decided that it would be in the best interests of the class if 
the award was distributed to benefit the class in some way.
440
 Wallis JA encouraged 
creativity with the remedy such as price reductions on the products or coupons, a 
remedy used in the United States. However, the underlying compensatory function 
must be realised within the proposed remedy.
441
   
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Private follow-on damages are a novel experience in South African competition law 
and have been sidelined until now. As discussed private competition enforcement 
has globally taken the fore in discussions and in jurisdictions such as the United 
States where it has been active for over a decade. They create a unique opportunity 
for consumers and competitors to be empowered to challenge cartelists while 
simultaneously offering supplementary assistance to public competition enforcement 
by creating a deterrent especially for recidivist behaviour.  
The Mukaddam and Children’s Resource Centre judgments have created 
ripples within competition law by paving the way for follow-on damages litigation 
and introduced class actions; a much needed procedural mechanism. Class actions 
will be able to cater for the indigent members of society and promote access to 
justice, a central tenant of the Constitution. Although, as was evident in the 
discussion, there are still some challenges to be addressed especially with regard to 
the nature of a claim and the extent of liability for follow-one damages. Nonetheless, 
there is clearly a legislative framework in existence that could make follow-on 
damages litigation part of the naturalia of competition enforcement in South Africa. 
“[A] successful competition regime needs public resources to be 
supplemented or complemented by private resources through actions in the 
courts.”
442
 Therefore, what should be encouraged is a marriage between public and 
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private enforcement. Competition enforcement in general could serve to benefit from 
discourse between the private sector, the Department of Trade and Industry and the 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
Cartels, as discussed, are the most egregious form of anti-competitive conduct. Not 
only do they enable inefficient firms to continue in the market but they strip 
consumers of their right to choose products/services at competitive market prices. 
The South African market has been particularly vulnerable to the emergence of 
cartels due to its highly concentrated markets, homogenous goods and high entry 
level barriers for other companies. The cartel offence was thus introduced to provide 
an additional deterrent for public competition enforcement against cartels in South 
Africa. 
Therefore, this dissertation sought to answer two fundamental questions:  
(i) Does the cartel offence have a place in South African competition law?  
(ii) If not, could private competition enforcement provide a more suitable 
alternative? 
An examination of existing legislation, policies and measures put in place to 
address cartels revealed just how porous the regulatory framework has been. The 
Competition Commission is highly reliant on two mechanisms; the corporate 
leniency policy and monetary administrative penalties. The leniency policy has been 
a highly effective tool, more so with the introduction of the recent fast-track 
settlement process. On a global scale, the leniency policy has become an integral 
component of many competition frameworks and the root of success. Administrative 
penalties which form the core of South Africa’s competition enforcement policy, 
have failed to provide the requisite deterrent effect. Consequentially, the cartel 
offence was formulated to fill the lacunae in public competition enforcement.  
An assessment of the general theoretical literature underpinning the cartel 
offence formed the apex of examining whether it could be introduced into South 
African competition law. Three factors were identified as key components of 
introducing a cartel offence namely: the moral nexus of a crime; the traditional 
theories of punishment and the efficiency of the normative competition framework 
for the implementation of the cartel offence. Cartels are not morally condemned by 
the general populous due to their non-violent nature. Therefore they are not regarded 
as criminal activity. However, cartels display the same furtive and criminal-like 
conduct which can be equate with property crimes thereby making cartels inherently 
77 
 
criminal. Due to the economic component of cartel activity, the economic theory of 
deterrence could be used as the prime basis for justifying and developing a cartel 
offence in South Africa. The third and final factor, which was the most significant, 
tested whether the existing South African competition framework could afford to 
have the cartel offence as a supplementary mechanism. This question was considered 
with reference to the United States and the United Kingdom as jurisdictions which 
had already introduced the cartel offence.  
The United States provided an exemplary framework because of its global 
reputation as a beacon of success. The United Kingdom which recently introduced 
the cartel offence provided an insightful look into the challenges and lessons South 
African could gain in developing the cartel offence. The comparative analysis 
illustrated that the cartel offence was positively complimented by competition 
frameworks in both jurisdictions despite the challenges faced.   
The discussion led to the conclusion that the cartel offence had been prematurely 
introduced in South Africa. First, it was evident that the constitutional issues created 
by the cartel offence would vehemently be opposed by various institutions. Access to 
equal justice forms a core component of the South African legislative framework and 
any provisions which sought to undermine this principle have undeniably been 
rejected. Secondly, the lack of cohesion between the NPA and the Commission 
would create significant difficulties for civil competition enforcement. Section 73A 
which gives the NPA sole jurisdiction to prosecute cartels and reduces the 
Commission’s submissions to mere pleas for leniency for certain cartelists. This will 
likely create tension between the NPA and the Commission and leave the system 
highly vulnerable.  
Which leads to the third issue; the leniency policy would be severely undermined 
by this structure. Section 73A will result in cartelists not being inclined to make use 
of the leniency policy due to the possibility of being held criminally liable for their 
conduct. The leniency policy will be rendered as ineffective. It was suggested that 
coordination and cooperation between these two institutions could be achieved if the 
provision was amended to be in line with the objectives of the Commission. 
However, this remains to be seen. 
It is at this juncture, that private competition enforcement can take the fore. As 
the study conducted in the United States provided, private competition enforcement 
will not only empower consumers, but provide the desired deterrent effect the cartel 
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offence was meant to achieve. The judgments of Mukaddam
444
 and Children’s 
Resource Centre
445
 recognised follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy and 
class actions as a procedural mechanism which can be utilised by aggrieved 
consumers and competitors. Not only do class actions provide procedural advantages 
but they eliminate the challenges which accompany individual litigation. This sort of 
progressive stance reinforces the notion that even the poorest in the country must 
feel the reach of the Competition Act. Individuals who under normal circumstances 
would have been excluded by the legal framework now have the opportunity to 
become part of what I regard as a revolutionary movement within competition law. 
The scale of this discussion is therefore multifaceted .What this dissertation 
highlighted was that although the judgments of Mukaddam and Children’s Resource 
Centre highlighted the challenges associated with developing a private competition 
framework, they placed a spotlight on uncertainties created by a lack of judicial 
guidance in developing private competition enforcement and the complexities it 
creates. In order to generate achievable policies and to encourage consumers and 
competitors to become active, there is a need for legislated class actions and a more 
developed common law. Ultimately, ‘public and private enforcement have to work 
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